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Abstract: The Constitutional Court of South Africa is perhaps the strongest institution in the 
country today. It is one of the few places for people to pursue institutional redress.  In light of 
this, this thesis critically examines the reasonableness standard, the depoliticizing rhetoric 
around poverty the Court uses, as well as the practical obstacles for individuals or groups 
pursuing public interest litigation through the judiciary. It has found that for the Court to be 
more effective institution in light of the failings of other bodies conceived of by the Constitution, 
a number of the Court’s approaches must be altered slightly.  The reasonableness standard must 
function more effectively as a programmatic guide for the government by substantively 
articulating a minimum core, one which will give government programs a goal to pursue and 
halt the vicious cycle of programs that don’t know what they are aspiring to. The Court also 
needs to better recognize the cost of the depoliticizing rhetoric it uses in its judgments, rhetoric 
that closes down political spaces for contesting poverty. Finally there are technical and practical 
obstacles including costs, direct access, and individual benefits that poor claimants face when 
trying to bring socioeconomic issues before the Court. All of these are problems that must be 
addressed for the Court, as potentially the only institutional actor left to fight for socioeconomic 
rights, to provide better redress to citizens whose rights have been violated.  
 
Introduction 
South Africa has been declared a winner since day one. With the advent of the South 
African Constitution and free and fair elections in 1994, resulting in the election of President 
Nelson Mandela, South Africa and the South African Constitution were popularly seen as the 
start of a new direction for the human rights movement.  With the conclusion of the Cold War, 
and the victory of the view that civil and political and socioeconomic rights needed to be treated 
as equally valuable, South Africa seemed to encompass the wide ranges of hopes for human 
rights going forward. Many claimed that oppression was over in South Africa and the country 
was merely a successful and peaceful transition away from leaving behind an abusive 
government-something rarely seen before. The model of the South African Constitution was to 
be utilized subsequently in a number of African states. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-
General  at the time of transition, welcomed South Africa back into the world community and 
paid tribute to President Nelson Mandela and  FW de Klerk at Mandela's presidential 
inauguration lunch, saying that "today South Africa regained its rightful place in Africa, in the 
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UN, and the family of nations. South Africa has earned the respect and admiration of all; tireless 
in search of understanding, and vigorous in pursuit of peace. You have refused to let difficulties 
defeat you."1 The transition, the Constitution, and the government were hailed as victorious 
before it had even begun to undertake the daunting task of governing a deeply divided country.  
The country today faces a number of economic, racial, religious, and political issues that 
have undercut the hope many people had at the end of apartheid. Youth that were born after the 
end of apartheid see a country that is still divided along many economic and racial lines. Though 
these divides exist in many countries across the world South Africa was thought to have a great 
chance at remedying them, due to its liberal constitution, robust civil society, and prominent 
human rights figures. 
In 1996, South Africa was transformed under a constitutional order with a fundamental 
commitment to human rights. Notable about the South African Constitution is the extent to 
which it reaches beyond civil and political rights to include social and economic rights such as: 
rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security environmental protection, education 
and equitable access to land.  By including these rights, the Constitution reaches towards what 
the Preamble describes as “freeing the potential of each person”2 and rectifying the economic 
inequality that plagued the country.  In doing so it also identified socioeconomic issues of 
inequality as one of the most formidable obstacles South Africa faces.  
                                               
1
 72 Days That Shaped South Africa." Southafrica.info. Big Media, n.d. Web. 5  
     Feb. 2014. <http://www.southafrica.info/about/history/72days11.htm>.  
2
 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)." Thepresidency.gov.za. South Africa Government, n.d. 
Web. 11 Mar.2014. <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/annual/2008/  
     preamble.pdf> 
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In order for these protections to be more than merely a hope, the 1996 Constitution does 
three particularly important things to ensure rights are realized. First the Constitution requires the 
State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.”3 Even if some 
social and economic rights are subject to progressive realization, the state is in any case under a 
specific legal obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill them. Second, the Constitution makes the 
rights in the Bill of Rights justiciable. If the state does not fulfill its duty, the citizens have 
recourse to an independent judiciary, which includes the Constitutional Court. Third the 
Constitution also creates several government entities and strategies aimed at strengthening 
constitutional democracy and helping citizen’s address human rights grievances. Among these 
are chapter nine institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission, an 
independent body meant to promote and monitor the realization of rights (among these 
socioeconomic rights).4 While touching on some of these other measures the Constitution 
implemented, this paper concerns itself primarily with the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court is the highest court of the independent judiciary through which 
individuals can seek recourse if their rights are violated. It is the body through which laws and 
policies are judged to be in accordance with the South African Constitution. This court was 
tasked with the burden of developing the jurisprudence around socioeconomic rights, which had 
traditionally been thought of as non-justiciable. During the transition the African National 
Congress came to power, and has subsequently dominated government, with part of their 
                                               
3
 Constitution, The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Department of Justice, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/constitution.htm>. 
4
 Newman, Dwight. "Institutional Monitoring of Social and Economic Rights:A South Africa Case Study and a New Research 
Agenda." ESCR-Net. International Network for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 2003. Web. 1 Apr. 
2014. <http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Newman_Institutional_Monitoring.pdf> 
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platform being the reconciliation of the economic divide between blacks and whites. The 
Constitutional Court has faced questions, concerns, and skepticism about whether it and other 
institutional bodies can deliver on the multitude of promises made in the Constitution.  
Today many of the aforementioned institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, 
various government economic programs aimed at redevelopment, and the government itself has 
come under criticism because they have proved ineffective at delivering on their promise to help 
rectify economic inequality. The change in government economic programs from the 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) to the Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution (GEAR) program largely abandoned the idea of development for the poor, the 
ANC dominated government has become increasingly criticized for corruption and 
ineffectiveness in lessening the inequality gap in the South Africa, and the Human Rights 
Commission has become largely impotent.  Because of these factors, the Court has unfortunately 
been thrust to the center of the debate around socioeconomic rights. As other institutions and 
programs have failed or fallen short of the expectations around them, the Court has been forced 
to shoulder much of the burden of realizing socioeconomic rights and along with this the blame 
for failing to do so. In this way, the Court is more central than perhaps it should be in the debate 
around these rights, and may have been asked to do things that courts traditionally do not do. 
That being said, the Court must reimagine how its approaches its jurisprudence around 
socioeconomic rights so as to better provide institutional redress for socioeconomic rights 
violations. 
 The impact of poverty on millions of South Africans cannot be understated and warrants 
a brief exploration. The Court recognized the detrimental impact that economic inequality has on 
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the country. In the Court’s inaugural socioeconomic rights case of Soobramoney, it observed 
that: 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions 
already existed when the constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our 
society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow 
ring.”5 
Written 12 years ago, it is important to note how little progress has been made in regards to 
inequality in spite of this sentiment.  
Inequality and abject poverty persist in the post-apartheid period of South African 
history. While the level of income poverty has fallen in the last two decades this decrease is not 
significant.  In fact in 2005, almost a quarter of South Africans lived under the lowest level of the 
poverty line, 174 rands per month, the equivalent of about 16 USD, while almost half of the 
population live on under 322 rands a month, or 30 USD. 6 It can also be observed that while 
racially defined income inequality has been falling, the average black worker still earns only a 
quarter of what the average white worker does and regardless, class based income inequality has 
increased exponentially. All of this has detrimentally affected South Africa’s ranking on the 
Human Development Index (HDI), which also takes into account measures of things like life 
                                               
5
 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal). Southern African Legal Information Institute. Constitutional Court of 
South Africa. 1997. Para 8 
6
 Hirsch, Alan. "The Unemployment Challenge in South Africa." Journal for Economic Development and Co-
operation (2008): n. pag. Print 
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expectancy, literacy, and educational quality. In 2009 South Africa, while ranked 78th in terms of 
per capita income, was 129th under the HDI.7 
 One of the more apparent indicators of slow socioeconomic progress though is the 
extremely high unemployment rate of 25 percent that South Africa faces, which is one of the 
highest in the world and more than double the rate in fellow middle-income sub-Saharan African 
countries.8 Unemployment is also heavily racialized and gendered. According to the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, using the strict unemployment definition, 27 percent of black 
South Africans, 20 percent of Coloured persons, and 10 percent of Indians were unemployed, as 
opposed to only 5 percent of whites. When the institute expanded the definition of 
unemployment, it found that African unemployment reached an astoundingly high level of 
almost 50 percent. In addition, women are also disproportionally affected, accounting for over 60 
percent of the unemployed in this category. 9 While South Africa has tried to address these issues 
by giving social security to at risk individuals, such as the elderly and children, there are no 
benefits for working-age individuals who are unemployed.  
 There are also issues with healthcare, education, basic services and housing. Health 
issues have been hugely problematic and this continues to be the case. Maternal deaths remain 
high and communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, plague South Africa. AIDS and HIV also 
remain a huge problem for the country, especially given the level of rape and gender based 
                                               
7Human Development Reports. United Nations Development Program, 20010. Web. 28  Apr. 2014. 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20061027013029/  http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=10&y=1&z=1> 
8
 Bhorat, Haroon. "Unemployment in South Africa: Descriptors and Determinants." Fourth IZA/World Bank Conference on 
Employment and Development. Bonn,Germany. 5 May 2009. Print. 
9
 South Africa Survey Online 2008/2009. South African Institute of Race Relations, 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.sairr.org.za/services/publications/ south-africa-survey/south-africa-survey-online-2008-2009> 
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violence, which is poorly investigated and perpetually underreported. In spite of the high levels 
of funds that are channeled into schools, education remains poor for many, specifically certain 
disadvantaged groups and regions. Additionally the majority of students who do manage to get 
an education are unable to find employment after they complete their education. While there has 
been statistical progress in increasing access to water and housing, there are concerns about the 
definition of “progress” given the high number of service disconnections that disproportionally 
affect the poor, and housing constructed by the government has been criticized for questionable 
integrity.10  In summation, the State of the World’s Cities Report by UN Habitat in 2008 
observed that,” South Africa stands out as a country that has yet to break out of an economic and 
political model that concentrates resources.”11 
  As can be seen, poverty is intimately affecting millions of South African citizens. The 
lack of tangible progress on the economic front has detrimentally impacted the legitimacy of 
institutions intended to ensure every individual has the basic services to ensure human dignity.   
What must now be explored, on the way to identifying the Court as the institution that now 
stands alone to handle socioeconomic issues, is how other supporting programs and institutions 
failed. 
Confidence in the ANC’s ability to carry out a systematic realization of socioeconomic 
rights through government programs have fallen drastically. The Reconstruction and 
Development program (RDP), the ANC’s flagship development strategy, was intended to 
                                               
10
 Langford, Malcolm, ed. Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa Symbols or Substance? Cambridge: Cambridge, 2013. 
Print. P.10 
11
 State of the World’s Cities Report 2008/2009. United Nations Habitat, 2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. 
<http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/ searchResults.aspx?sort=relevance&page=search&searchField=title&searchstring=State+
of+the+World%E2%80%99s+Cities++2008%2F2009&x=0&y=0> 
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generate rapid economic growth whilst simultaneously alleviating the poverty and deprivation 
affecting the majority of the black population. In the early days of the program, which set out a 
broad framework for socio-economic reform, it attracted virtually universal political support. 
However, the RDP came to mean very different things to different people: for some, it 
“constituted a 'vision for the fundamental (in the extreme, for the socialist) transformation' of 
South African society; for others, it represented little more than a set of loose quantitative targets 
for measuring progress in specific areas; for yet others, it offered a 'lever' for the reprioritization 
of government spending”12 
  Overall though, it has been strongly argued that the RDP had been used by the new 
government in general and the ANC in particular, to defer making some hard choices in respect 
of economic policies.  According to Jesmond Blumenfeld, a Senior Lecturer in Economics at 
Brunel University, West London: 
“whether in terms of totally 'transforming' South African society, or of delivery of substantial 
'developmental' improvements, the RDP must be adjudged to have failed….forthcoming 'growth and 
development strategy' will need to place rather more emphasis on the 'growth’ than on the 'development' 
aspects of the problem”13 
This forthcoming strategy, which would emphasize growth over develop came in 
the form of GEAR - standing for Growth, Employment and Redistribution. This program 
foresaw increased revenue along with responsible expenditure as a way to reduce the 
government deficit. In this respect and in raising South Africa’s GDP, GEAR has been 
                                               
12
 Blumenfeld, Jesmond. "RDPRIP? Reflections on Economic Growth and Development Policy in South Africa." The South 
African Institute Of International Affairs 10 (1996): 1-4. Print. P.2 
13Blumenfeld, Jesmond. "RDPRIP? Reflections on Economic Growth and Development Policy in South Africa." The South 
African Institute Of International Affairs 10 (1996): 1-4. Print. P.3 
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moderately successful.14 What it has been less successful at though, is curbing 
unemployment and improving the lives of the poorest South Africans.  The Congress of 
South African Trade Unions argued in 2001 that: 
 
“In contrast to political progress, in socio-economic terms the legacy of apartheid remains 
entrenched and, with the massive loss of jobs in the past decade, even appears to be worsening.… 
Unemployment and underemployment are on the rise as more jobs are shed and people rely on 
survivalist activities to make ends meet.  The complex nature of the transition [from apartheid] 
emerged in deeply contradictory government policies."15 
The previous reflection on current poverty in South Africa further reflects the inability of 
GEAR to make a meaningful difference in South Africa. In spite of South Africa’s strong 
constitutional protections for human rights the government repeatedly struggles to meet public 
demands for better realization of economic and social rights. Additionally problems with 
financial mismanagement, corruption, and deep concerns about the capacity of governmental 
leadership and administration—especially at the local government level—have contributed to 
inhibiting the progressive realization of economic and social rights.16  
With increasingly few places to turn to have their needs met, many citizens have taken to 
the streets, protesting against numerous real and perceived injustices. Peter Alexander, professor 
of sociology and South African Research Chair in Social Change at the University of 
Johannesburg, argues that: 
“Since 2004, South Africa has experienced a movement of local protests amounting to a rebellion of the 
poor. This has been widespread and intense, reaching insurrectionary proportions in some cases. On the 
surface, the protests have been about service delivery and against uncaring, self-serving, and corrupt 
                                               
14
 Walker, James. "South Africa's Economy: Much To Be Done." BBC News [London] 1996, Special Report: n. pag. Print. 
15
 Knight, Richard. "South Africa: Economic Policy and Development." Shared Interest. Shared Interest:Investing in South 
Africa's Future, 2001.Web. 28 Apr. 2014. <http://richardknight.homestead.com/files/ sisaeconomy.htm>.  
16
 World Report 2013. Human Rights Watch, 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-
chapters/south-africa> 
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leaders of municipalities. A key feature has been mass participation by a new generation of fighters, 
especially unemployed youth but also school students. Many issues that underpinned the ascendancy of 
Jacob Zuma also fueled the present action, including a sense of injustice arising from the realities of 
persistent inequality”17 
This is indicative of the poor becoming increasingly disillusioned with the ability of the 
government to meet their needs.  Because of this they are desperately taking to the streets as a 
way to make themselves heard, having largely abandoned institutional methods of redress they 
see as having failed them.  Their criticisms bear the inertia of years of vast economic inequality 
and injustice and have flown thick and fast and with the lack of change around the issues of 
socioeconomic welfare.   
Having explored how economic programs have abandoned a development agenda and 
government is suffering from ever higher levels of distrust over issues like corruption a critical 
eye must now be turned to chapter nine intuitions, particularly the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC).  Once envisioned as a way to monitor and promote the respect of human 
rights in the country, it has fallen short of its original goals. It was originally given a wide range 
of powers and envisioned as one of the primary drivers through which human rights could be 
realized and enforced. It may, for example, investigate human rights abuses and take steps to 
secure redress for these violations. Some methods for this include bringing cases to court and 
carrying out education about human rights. The SAHRC may also subpoena witnesses, a 
potentially powerful mechanism for its investigations. Finally, it also has powers of search and 
seizure, though these have not yet been exercised. At the risk of criminal penalty, all organs of 
state at all levels are obliged to give reasonable assistance to the commission if they require such 
                                               
17
 Alexander, Peter. "Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests - a Preliminary Analysis." Review of 
African Political Economy 37.123 (2010): 25-40. Print 
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aid in order to pursue and complete its tasks. However, it has no power to enforce its 
recommendations, or even to require a response.18 
In spite of the SAHRC’s inability to enforce recommendations it was envisioned as a 
critical cog in the realization of human rights. The Asmal Committee, which recently conducted 
a review of chapter nine institutions in South Africa, including the SAHRC, found that, “the 
bodies do not use the existing mechanisms to ensure they exercise their powers fully. Many of 
the institutions under review do not at present perform to the best of their ability or capacity. We 
report on this more in sorrow rather than in anger.”19 This reflects a popular belief held by many 
South Africans, and in part demonstrated by the abundance of street protests. 
 The SAHRC has also been criticized for a lack of focus and thoroughness in its 
investigations, and in particular for spreading itself too thinly among many issue areas, rather 
than concentrating on a few where it could remain engaged and make a real difference. Others 
have criticized some of the SAHRC's interventions as being designed to grab headlines without 
achieving much. The multitude of monitoring bodies created by the Constitution and by 
legislation has led to further confusion as the proliferation of bodies created overlapping 
jurisdictions, which are very confusing for the public as they work to access the SAHRC. It is 
also costly for the taxpayer and it creates the possibility of unhealthy competition for media 
attention, resources, and opens different institutions to future manipulation by the government. 
Another weakness of the commission, and other chapter nine institutions, is the lack of clarity as 
                                               
18
 "South Africa:South African Human Rights Commission." EISA. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 
2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. <http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/ south-africa-south-african-human-rights-commission> 
19
 Asmal, Kader. "Remarks at the Launch of the report of the ad hoc Committee on the review of Chapter 9 and Associated 
Institutions." Memo. 21 Aug. 2007.TS. Parliament of South Africa 
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to the action that should be taken on its recommendations.20 While this is a brief overview of the 
criticisms of chapter nine institutions, there are two issues that warrant further interrogation.  
One of these is the way in which these institutions lack accessibility to ordinary citizens, 
particularly the poorest. This is especially concerning given the fact they are constitutionally 
mandated to protect and promote the rights of these very citizens21. A number of chapter nine 
institutions have well-established provincial offices, but the overall effectiveness of these offices 
in providing access for citizens is uncertain. It is also unclear whether they have set up rural 
offices in line with the aforementioned Asmal Report’s recommendation. Perhaps more 
shockingly, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has reported that citizens remain 
generally unaware of the existence of chapter nine institutions like the SAHRC and are poorly 
educated on their purpose, powers, and functions22.  Ipso facto, they do not know where these 
institutions are situated, how to access them, or what their purpose is.   
South African civil society has criticized the South African Human Rights Commission 
further for its cautious relationship with the government. This is attributed to the fact that 
commissioners don’t want to aggravate government because “the leadership of institutions such 
as these are appointed by the president and also funded by state departments.”23 This is acutely 
                                               
20
 "South Africa:South African Human Rights Commission." EISA. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 
2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. <http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/ south-africa-south-african-human-rights-commission> 
21
 The Democracy and Governance Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council. "Final Report: 
Assessment of the relationship between the Chapter 9 Institutions and Civil Society." Human Sciences Research 
Council (2007):n. pag. Print. 
22
 The Democracy and Governance Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council. "Final Report: 
Assessment of the relationship between the Chapter 9 Institutions and Civil Society." Human Sciences Research 
Council (2007):n. pag. Print. 
23
 The Democracy and Governance Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council. "Final Report: 
Assessment of the relationship between the Chapter 9 Institutions and Civil Society." Human Sciences Research 
Council (2007):n. pag. Print. 
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apparent as many commissioners belong to the African National Congress.24 As academic 
Thomas Keil wrote, “Since the ANC has a dominant position in Parliament, there is the inherent 
danger that candidates are selected according to how convenient they are for the ruling party.”25 
The result of this is that appointees are sometimes, potentially most of the time, ill-equipped to 
carry out the duties of the SAHRC, which detrimentally impact that effectiveness and 
transformational approach of these institutions. Reflecting on this development as the ANC 
nominated appointees for SAHRC commissionership in 2010, Pierre de Vos, a South African 
legal scholar, wonders: 
“Why did the ANC controlled committee nominate some of these characters when so much better candidates applied 
for appointment? Why was the process politicised? Why were candidates with a strong human rights background 
and a track record of fighting against racism and discrimination not appointed? It is not as if the SAHRC can declare 
invalid actions of the executive or the legislature. It is supposed to promote and protect the human rights of ordinary 
people and the more effective and passionate the Commissioners are, the better ordinary people will be served. 
Maybe some of these Commissioners will surprise us all and will do sterling work. But do not hold your breath.26” 
The detriments of such a process are not merely hypothetical. A former Public Protector, 
Lawrence Mushwana, poorly investigated the Oilgate party funding scandal27, in which the Mail 
and Guardian revealed that 11 million rands of tax payers’ money had been funneled into ANC 
coffers through the oil trader Imvume. The ANC and Imvume were not held responsible, largely 
                                               
24
 The Democracy and Governance Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council. "Final Report: 
Assessment of the relationship between the Chapter 9 Institutions and Civil Society." Human Sciences Research 
Council (2007):n. pag. Print. 
25
 Keil, Thomas. "Supporting Constitutional Development in South Africa: A Study of the Effectiveness of the Three Chapter 
9 Institutions." Chapter 9 Institutions in South Africa. Democracy Development Program, 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.ddp.org.za/siteworkspace/ Final%20Report%20Thomas%20Keil.pdf/view> 
26
 De Vos, Pierre. "Human Rights Commission Appointments Not Up To Scratch." Constitutionally Speaking. Pierre de Vos, 
28 Sept. 2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/ human-rights-commission-appointments-not-up-to-
scratch/>. 
27Faull, Lionell. "Mushwana Unmoved by Oilgate Ruling." Mail and Guardian Africa's Best Read. Mail and Guardian, 10 June 
2011. Web. 28 Apr. 
2014.<http://mg.co.za/article/ 2011%E2%80%9006%E2%80%9010%E2%80%90mushwana%E2%80%90unmoved%E2%8
0%90by%E2%80%90oi lgate%E2%80%90ruling> 
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because Mushwana argued that he “could not follow the money as his mandate did not extend to 
oversight of non-state entities such as Imvume and the ANC”28. He was sharply criticized for 
deliberately shielding the ANC instead of protecting the public interest. Unsurprisingly, this 
event and other similar occurrences have hurt the reputation of institutions such as the Public 
Protector, SAHRC, and others. In the end it is easy to ask the question-where has this left 
individuals looking for institutional means of redress for socioeconomic violations? In many 
instances, they have gone to the judiciary, specifically the Constitutional Court one of the few 
tools left in a shrinking toolbox.  
The Constitutional Court has undertaken a number of actions in an attempt to carry out its 
mandate and develop a jurisprudence of socio economic rights so that it can continue on the path 
of transformative constitutionalism. One of the most important tools in this regard is the 
reasonableness standard, a review mechanism through which the Court evaluates state policies. It 
also has shown a strong tendency to protect encroachments upon individual’s socioeconomic 
rights by the state. Additionally, a stipulation of meaningful engagement has been developed so 
as to provide more dialogue and communication between parties the hope that a solution can be 
found and alleviate the need to go to the Court.   
There have also been some instances in which the legal mobilization that has occurred 
around the issue at hand in a case has resulted in positive change regardless of the eventual 
ruling of the Court. This can be seen in the case of TAC, in which many municipalities decided to 
expand access to the HIV treatment drug Nevirapine before the Court ruled in favor of the 
                                               
28
 Sole, Sam. "The ANC's Oilgate." Mail and Guardian Africa's Best Read. Mail and Guardian, 3 May 2005. Web. 28 Apr. 
2014. <http://mg.co.za/article/ 2005-05-03-the-ancs-oilgate>. 
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applicants. Additionally, as could be observed in the case of Olivia Rd and Thabelisha Homes, 
the Court has taken measures and put up obstacles that have drastically lowered the rate of 
eviction in South Africa, and in many places have stopped to practice altogether.  
However, in light dearth of further institutional support for the Court, its jurisprudential 
approach falls short of what is needed in the current environment. The Court today stands alone 
to tackle the vast array of socioeconomic issues as it is possibly the only institution with the 
capacity and legitimacy to do so. Because of this the Court must expand its jurisprudential 
approach to take up some of the tasks that were originally placed on other institutions in order to 
provide a more holistic approach to realizing socioeconomic rights as well as serving as a more 
open medium for institutional redress. Public opinion seems to be ripe for a more assertive and 
active Court. People are taking to the streets and engaging in illegal service reconnection to have 
their socioeconomic needs met. Issues of poverty and basic services have been identified as the 
most important issue of the upcoming 2014 elections.29 While this paper could examine why 
other institutions have failed or why the Court cannot do any more than it has already done, that 
is not its goal. The economic situation in South Africa is not good, yet it is possible to envision 
how the Court, the one institution left substantively standing, might engage with socioeconomic 
rights differently in the future given the lack of institutional support around it. Identifying and 
articulating this differential approach is the objective of this paper.  
This thesis will first look at the arguments surrounding the inclusion of these rights in the 
Constitution and the history of how they came to be enshrined there. In chapter two it will 
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examine the development of jurisprudence the court has undertaken when deciding 
socioeconomic cases and look at the importance and contributions of foundational cases such as 
Soobramoney, Grootboom, TAC, Olivia Rd, Thubelisha Homes, and Mazibuko.  In using the 
Constitutional Court’s landmark rulings on certain key issues as case studies, it is possible to 
extrapolate the Court’s developing jurisprudence around socio economic rights. Finally, chapter 
three will critically examine various aspects of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence such as 
the reasonableness standard, the depoliticizing rhetoric around poverty the Court uses, as well as 
practical obstacles for individuals or groups pursuing litigation through the judiciary. As perhaps 
the strongest institution in the country of South Africa today, it is one of the few places for 
people to pursue institutional redress. If it does not recognize this, and address the critiques 
raised in the following pages, it runs the risk of standing on the sidelines while poor individuals 
walk away from its chambers, into the streets, and out of the institutional methods of redress 
altogether.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1:The Making of the Constitution, Apartheid, and Socioeconomic Rights  in South 
Africa 
   In 1910, the Union of South Africa was inaugurated and the resultant Constitution, 
negotiated by the Boers (white South Africans of Dutch heritage) and the British colonizers, 
provided for an all-powerful government which consisted of only white men and removed the 
minimal voting rights which black people had previously held. This was despite native South 
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Africans lobbying the conference where the constitution was drafted to include them in the 
process30 
For non-white South Africans this marginalization would be a trend over the following 
90 years, and foreshadowed the foundation of the apartheid system that would come later. 
Following the removal of native voting rights the new government moved quickly to implement 
a number of restrictive legislative measures, such as the infamous 1913 Land Act, which 
oppressed, dispossessed, and disenfranchised native South Africans of land. The Land Act set 
aside a paltry 7.5% of the land in South Africa non-whites, which were the majority of the 
population. The act also stipulated that non-whites could not possess any land outside of their 
tribal areas. The act created problems for non-whites who worked on white land but had their 
own piece of property. Essentially share-croppers, these people had to decide between working 
for the white farm owners and moving to the areas set aside for non-whites people.  
The response of many Africans to these initial incursions on their rights was the 
formation of a single body under which Africans could unite and pursue their own interests. The 
end result of the desire for representation was the formation of the African National Congress 
(ANC), on the 8th of January, 1912. The birth of this organization served multiple purposes. Not 
only did it give Africans a clear avenue through which to work for change and articulate their 
plight, it also would become the headquarters of their eventual resistance. Perhaps most 
importantly though, the ANC provided non-white South Africans with a vision and hope of a 
better life, which would become necessary in the struggles the future held. Fighting a 
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constitutional order in which institutional segregation and economic disenfranchisement was 
legally enforced, the hope of many natives was for a South Africa that was democratic, equal, 
and just. 
Apartheid South Africa 
Over the next 50 years, the Afrikaner National Party was able to gain a strong majority in 
parliament. Strategists in the National Party invented apartheid as a means to cement their 
control over the economic and social system. Initially, the aim of the apartheid was to maintain 
white domination while extending racial separation. Starting in the ‘60s, a plan of “Grand 
Apartheid'' was executed, emphasizing territorial separation and police repression.31 
The origin of this system was the idea of maintaining control over and fully utilizing 
South Africa’s extensive mineral resources by ensuring a continuous source of cheap labor.  
Through continuous legislative policies of segregation, which limited access by African people 
to advanced skills and the market in general, apartheid reinforced the place of Africans solely as 
a source of cheap labor to work in mines and other mineral industries. The need for cheap labor 
became even more acute when South Africa experienced a post-World War I economic crisis, 
resulting in a sharp dip in gold prices. To maintain any sort of profit margin, the state Chamber 
of Mines was forced to lay off large amounts of its white work force and employ cheaper, semi-
skilled black workers at substantially lower rates. This directly exacerbated conflict between 
poor white workers and poor black workers.  
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To continue to have a source of cheap labor that would sustain their profitability, the 
government needed to make sure that people came to urban areas and for this reason they 
introduced taxes targeting non-whites. The result of this was that young men left their families to 
come to the cities to earn more money. This money was then given over to the chief of their 
community to pay these new taxes. This was essentially a system of migrant labor - people 
moved across the country, often far from home, to work for a short while and then return to their 
families. There were few job opportunities in the non-white areas and therefore the migration to 
the city was a necessary, precisely and what the government had envisioned when it introduced 
higher taxes.  
The system of migrant labor caused problems to develop in black society. Young men 
sometimes could not marry until they had done a certain amount of labor for the chief. Families 
were disrupted. Farms were left in the hands of women and young children. Men in the cities 
became used to the western way of life, and did not want to settle on the farms again. The tribal 
and traditional society of native South Africans was broken up. 
In urban areas, Africans were quickly becoming the majority of the poor working class, 
and increasingly dispossessing whites of jobs which whites felt they were entitled to, leading to 
greater Afrikaner nationalism. At the same time the introduction of an urban African working 
class allowed for greater unity among the working poor, which led to the rise of the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) as well as a strengthening of the ANC.32 
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 In 1948, the National Party, firmly in power, introduced the policy of apartheid. With the 
enactment of apartheid laws, racial discrimination became firmly institutionalized throughout the 
country. The race laws of apartheid policy touched every aspect of social life, such as prohibiting 
marriage between non-whites and whites and the sanctioning of ``white-only'' jobs. In 1950, the 
Population Registration Act required that all South Africans be racially classified into one of 
three categories: white, black (African), or coloured (of mixed decent). The coloured category 
included major demographic subgroups of Indians and Asians. Classification into these 
categories was based on appearance, social acceptance, and descent. A person could not be 
considered white if one of his or her parents were non-white. The determination that a person 
was ``obviously white'' would take into account ``his habits, education, and speech and 
deportment and demeanor.''33 A black person would be of or accepted as a member of an African 
tribe or race, and a colored person is one that is not black or white. All blacks were required to 
carry ``pass books'' containing their fingerprints, photos, and information on their degree of 
access to non-black areas.34 These demeaning policies would exist for many years but also 
inspired opposition within the communities they were working to oppress.  
 In response to these oppressive laws, racial categories (blacks, Indians, and coloureds) 
found cause to unite, and led various campaigns of defiance, the most widespread of which 
occurred in 1952. Three years later, in June 26, 1955, a Congress of the People was called by the 
oppressed parties, to which all political parties were invited. Over several thousand delegates 
showed up, and after much consultation the Freedom Charter was drafted, which was in effect 
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the initial draft of a new and inclusive constitution for South Africa35. This Congress illustrated 
the development of the various parties involved from a simple apartheid opposition movement to 
a more mature political movement that had leadership, goals, and an agenda. Heavily inspired by 
the Atlantic Charter, which was the initial document to articulate self-determination of peoples as 
a demand, the Freedom Charter would greatly influenced what a democratic South Africa would 
look like and left a mark on a generation of political leaders. The importance and sentiments of 
the document are reflected in the opening paragraph of the Charter, which reads: 
“We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is 
based on the will of all the people; that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and 
peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality; that our country will never be 
prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; that 
only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without 
distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white 
together equals, countrymen and brothers adopt this Freedom Charter; And we pledge ourselves to strive 
together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won.”36 
Here the ANC’s commitment to recognizing the inequality that came as a result of apartheid is 
apparent, as is the emphasis on the recognition of multiple forms of injustice. There is also the 
hopeful overture for lessening the huge wealth disparity that had developed from years of 
exploitive labor laws and apartheid.  Thus the nascent beginnings and contours of a new South 
Africa were traced.  
In the years before 1960, there were increasing calls for an inclusive conference to 
discuss the upcoming referendum to declare South Africa a republic. In May of 1957, then ANC 
President-General Albert Luthuli appealed for a national convention to discuss the various issues 
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on hand, such as the continuation of apartheid policies in the new republic. His calls were 
ignored.  Other calls for conventions were also ignored by the white elite in power, which led to 
a greater militant thinking within the ANC, and increased frustrations among African 
nationalists. In 1960 a massive campaign of defiance was launched, and over 10,000 people were 
arrested.  Yet on May 31, 1961 the government held referendum for whites only which 
subsequently declared South Africa a republic.  
This vote abolished the Union of South Africa created by the South Africa Act of 1909 
and established the Republic of South Africa. Important departures from the previous 
constitution included a president, a prime minister, and an executive council (or cabinet) which 
would be based in Pretoria. A bicameral legislature was also created to be based in Cape Town 
and an independent judiciary in Bloemfontein. 
One thing that didn’t change though was the white dominance over political life, 
primarily through a discriminatory electoral structure that disenfranchised non-whites. The Bantu 
Authorities Act of 1951 restricted the political participation of blacks to the homelands called 
Bantustan and effectively removed their say in the national direction of South Africa. While 
there were selective reforms in 1964 and 1968 which opened some political space to Asians and 
Coloureds by allowing limited political participation in ethnic affairs, this was only a token 
participation. Following this, a Coloured Persons' Representative Council was created in 1964 
and a South African Indian Council established in 1968. There was no creation of such a council 
for black South Africans. 37 
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The 1961 referendum and the exclusion of blacks in the drafting of a new constitution 
marked an acute break in South Africa’s history.  Over the next 30 years, the country would slide 
into an armed conflict, drawn along racial lines.  In March 1961 the leaders of the ANC and 
others conducted an All-In Conference which included fourteen hundred delegates from all 
around the country. These delegates represented one hundred and fifty different and diverse 
subsections of society, including various religious, social, political, and cultural groups. While 
the white elite and the National Party ignored the conference, there were two important 
resolutions that were decided upon and would allude to future conflict. The conference resolved 
that the government and constitution of South Africa, because it was decided without the 
participation or consent of the African people could not be legitimate and therefore could have 
no moral validity or merit any support. Secondly, it resolved to demand a National Convention 
that would be inclusive of all South Africans, that this convention be called by the government, 
and that the representatives decide a new and non-racial constitution for the Republic of South 
Africa. 38 
These resolutions were, expectedly, not heeded by the government. Instead, their reaction 
was to ban the ANC and other African nationalist organizations. The result of this was that these 
parties were left with no legal avenue through which to pursue their causes, which eventually led 
to the ANC concluding it had no option but to take up an armed struggle against the government. 
By 1964, after a number of years of government crackdowns, much of the ANC’s leadership was 
in jail or out of the country and it seemed that the government had effectively silenced the 
movement. However this silence would not last long.  
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South Africa became the focus of the world and was widely condemned for the practice 
of apartheid after the government suppressed a number of peaceful protests such as the 
Sharpeville Massacre, in which hundreds of people (including children) were killed. Throughout 
the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, thousands of South Africans fled the country due to oppressive policies 
or to join the liberation movement. Through it all, the armed struggle was gaining momentum, 
buoyed by the international criticism of South Africa. With all these coming to bear on it, the 
government recognized the need for at least the appearance of reform.  
In 1978, then Prime Minister Botha began changing the state to allow for various types of 
reform. One of the more significant changes he undertook was the creation of a new government 
department, The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. This department was 
set up to introduce “reforms” while the military and security apparatus proceeded to take on a 
much more integral role in the strategic-decision making of the state. In 1983 with the help of the 
government he formed a new Tricameral Parliament and a President’s Council. These bodies 
were created to give the appearance of opening up the political realm for more equal 
participation by all races but in reality whites still dominated the institutional mechanisms of 
power.  
This was South Africa’s last attempt at reform and lasted until the demise of apartheid in 
1993 and the sweeping changes that would follow. During much of this time period though, non-
white South Africans effectively lived under martial law due to the increased prominence the 
state security apparatus took in decision making.  
Botha’s period of rule was shaped by a strategy that fought the militancy of the ANC and 
other parties with reform and repression. The strategies were heavily influenced by Botha’s 
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militaristic style of government, learned in part through his time in the armed forces and studying 
the strategies of the military dictatorships of Latin America. However this strategy was met with 
only limited success. By 1984 armed resistance had intensified and ANC military operations in 
South Africa had risen to 50 strikes a year. By 1985, the ANC had developed a presence in rural 
areas and had even taken up the use of landmines.  Nineteen eighty six was declared the year of 
the people’s army and Umkhonto we Sizwe(MK) was formed. Alternative local structures of 
government were set up in the townships along with peoples courts and these mechanisms 
proceeded to govern many townships and rural areas as the state was having difficulty governing 
large swathes of the country.  With the formation of MK, and the formalization of the idea of a 
people’s army, the number of attacks rose to between 250 and 300 per year from 1986 on.  
Within the various banned parties there was also debate at this time about how best to proceed 
with the liberation movement. Many within the movement wanted to start a guerilla war that 
some believed would force the government to the negotiating table. A decision had to be made, 
and the desire and drive for meaningful change was palpable.  
 While many in these organizations pushed for war, there were a core group of senior 
leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, and Nelson Mandela who continued to hold out for 
a peaceful negotiation and transition. It was during this time period that negotiation began 
between Mandela and representatives of Botha’s government, as Botha realized that the crisis in 
South Africa was reaching cataclysmic proportions and drastic political change was necessary.  
In addition, there was mounting international pressure and the realization among the 
white political class that the apartheid system was unsustainable. This forced Botha and the NP 
towards dismantling the system of apartheid. The initial step was the lifting of the ban on 
political organizations, specifically and primarily the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
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release of Nelson Mandela after he spent 27 years in prison. After this there was a repeal of the 
apartheid legislation.  These developments took place against a backdrop of intense political 
violence. In spite of the violence, between this period and 1993, the NP, the ANC and other 
political organizations, engaged in a series of negotiations under the umbrella of the Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), that, despite many starts, stops, and points of 
contention eventually led to the adoption of an interim constitution to govern the transition to a 
new South Africa. This came after an all-white referendum in which over 60 percent of whites 
voted in favor of absolute reforms, clearing the way for a new South African nation. 
The Transition to a New South Africa 
The transition to a new South Africa and what the new Constitution included many 
debates, the substance of which is too far reaching to cover here. Yet one set of rights and 
entitlements that was heavily debated was the idea of including socio economic rights in the 
Constitution. The African National Congress, throughout its history, had maintained a 
commitment to such rights. In fact, the implication of this commitment was that the inclusion of 
these rights in the Constitution was almost a requirement for the ANC in the eyes of its 
supporters. The ANC saw no separation between the political and socioeconomic rights. This is 
due to the fact that oppression of the South African people was not just political, but 
socioeconomic as well and left millions in destitute poverty.39 
 During the time that the Constitution was being negotiated the Cold War was coming to 
an end and the result was that civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights were no longer 
necessarily placed in a hierarchy, but was instead seen as mutually reinforcing and necessary.  
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The mutual realization of these rights, something that had been seen as near impossible because 
the Soviet Union aligned itself with the idea of socioeconomic rights and the United States with 
civil and political rights, did not seem insurmountable anymore. Thus an increased emphasis was 
placed on both civil and political and socioeconomic rights by the human rights movement. It 
was hoped that socioeconomic rights, pursued by the government and enshrined in the 
constitution, might be the way towards the actualization of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights ideal of “freedom from fear and want”40. 
A number of the ANC’s important documents, such as the Freedom Charter, lend weight 
to the importance of socioeconomic rights, specifically as a means to rectify the vast economic 
inequality that existed in the country. For instance, the Charter states that: 
“Education shall be free, compulsory, universal, and equal for all children…All people shall have the right 
to..be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security…..No one shall go hungry; 
and free medical care and hospitalization shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young 
childen…”41 
 
Though it was not a formal ANC document, the Charter represented the philosophical goals and 
expression of the general anti-apartheid movement and the ANC specifically, shaping their 
characters and actions. 42 It was also the precursor to a number of important other documents, 
which figured prominently into the shaping of the ANC constitutional priorities such as the 1988 
Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, Ready to Govern in 1992, and the draft 
of the Bill of Rights that was written in 1990. 
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 The Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa was drafted by the ANC 
Constitutional committee and with the vast popular support the party enjoyed, seemed as if it 
could become reality. It included explicit references to the Freedom Charter, specifically stating 
that “The Constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter….the state 
and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active steps to eradicate, 
speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination.”43 
 As 1992 began, the ANC wrote Ready to Govern, expanding upon their constitutional 
guidelines they wished to see laid out at CODESA.44 Whereas Constitutional Guidelines 
reinforced the commitment of the ANC to the values of the Freedom Charter, this document 
instead fleshed out a more nuanced and mature application of those. The result of this was a 
more coherent application of those values to the enormous project of constitution making within 
the unique context of South Africa. Ready to Govern grew out of years on internal debate in the 
ANC and demonstrated their clear intent to place affirmative burdens on the state in reference to 
socioeconomic rights: 
“The Bill of Rights will affirm the right of all persons to have access to basic educational, health, and 
welfare services. It will establish principles and mechanisms to ensure that there is an enforceable and 
expanding minimum floor of entitlements for all, in the areas of education, health, and welfare. It will 
commit the courts to take into account the need to reduce malnutrition, unemployment, and homelessness 
when making any decisions…..Special agencies linked to Parliament and the courts should be set up so as 
to ensure that national, regional, and local authorities apply appropriate shares of their budgets to achieving 
these rights, taking into account the problems of limited resources and affordability”45 
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The drafts of the Bill of Rights that were put forward intimately adhered to these principles and 
were pushed by the ANC’s representatives for enshrinement into the Interim Constitution.  
 The National Party was against the idea of including socioeconomic rights in the 
Constitution.  The traditional arguments against the justifiability of such rights and realpolitik 
arguments about the South African economy formed the bedrock of their opposition. The NP 
leader at the time, FW De Klerk argued that “only if economic security can be maintained 
together with political security will we have the stability that is necessary to build a new South 
Africa.”46  De Klerk saw socioeconomic rights as compromising South Africa’s economic 
security due to the positive costs they placed on the government. The arguments of the NP are 
similar to the larger arguments against socioeconomic rights at the time. The opponents of the 
entrenchment of these rights in the Constitution argued that the indeterminacy of these rights, the 
positive nature of their obligation on the state, and their policy and financial implications 
rendered them unfit for judicial deliberation. The untethered idealism of such rights would risk 
the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution as a whole if the state was, as many believed,  
unable to meet the substantive demands for things like housing and basic services that it might be 
forced to act upon. 47  
In relation to courts, and Constitutional Courts in particular, it was argued that the unique 
nature of socioeconomic rights and the institutional limitations of courts would make the 
adjudication of these relatively new rights nothing short of impossible. One side of this debate 
was that socioeconomic rights were fundamentally different rights from those of civil and 
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political rights. This difference was articulated as the division between “negative” and “positive” 
rights. Traditional political practices and rights such as equal protection, freedom of expression, 
and due process, are largely seen as negative because they require the state to abstain from 
intervening with the individual’s experience of the right. In short, these rights are to be free from 
interference by the government. Socioeconomic rights on the other hand are identified as positive 
rights because they place affirmative obligations on the state to push particular programs or 
policies that focus on various areas of social welfare. The traditional paradigm of rights supports 
and encourages this separation. Negative rights are justiciable because they involve a narrow 
interpretation of the law in discrete cases, examine precise rights, and to remedy them requires 
that the government only cease from taking some action that would violate the right. Positive 
rights necessarily aim to exhort something from the government because they are vaguely 
worded, involve increasingly complex issues, and assign unacceptable positive obligations to 
government, which the government might not even necessarily be able to meet.48 In relation to 
the National Party, their rejection of social rights justiciability relies on socioeconomic rights 
inability to be effectively adjudicated. With this in mind, the real concern of the NP is not 
necessarily the nature of socioeconomic rights, but what they fear judges and courts might do 
with such rights.  
Another contention of the conventional wisdom around socio economic rights and courts 
can be divided into two areas-political legitimacy and institutional competence. Arguments about 
legitimacy emphasize the blasphemy of assigning the task of interpreting social values and ills to 
the most undemocratic institution in a democracy-the judiciary. Perhaps most critically, the issue 
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at hand is allowing the court to interfere in an allegedly core legislative task- the allocation of 
state monies. The task of crafting a remedy in a social rights case is too close to the legislature’s 
traditional role of deciding and implementing policy. Through this lens, if socioeconomic rights 
are justiciable, they would intrude in an impermissible way on the duties of the legislative 
branch. This would especially be the case when a court overrides a legislative act regarding 
social values and welfare in a way that asserts the state must take a different course of action. 
Such an assertion would upset the traditional view of the separation of powers in a constitutional 
democracy.  
Institutional competency is another core concern of the opponents of socioeconomic 
rights. This concern focuses on procedural limitations-a courts capacity to not only attain, but 
then assess the massive and extensive amounts of information that would come when 
deliberating on a social welfare case. Not to mention the potentially problematic aspects of a 
court’s remedies. To detractors, it is unlikely that a court has the institutional capacity to 
properly adjudicate social and economic rights for many when coming into contact with a single 
complainant or group. Encountering individual claimants is a procedure that is inappropriate for 
adjudication because the limited deliberation and singularly focused remedies that a court creates 
to address the issue cannot easily account of all individuals that are in a similar situation. In 
short, how is it possible for the court to hear a singular complaint, assess all the available 
information on the subject, and then craft a directive or policy that would be effective for the 
broader population that the claimant represents?49  
                                               
49
 Christiansen, Eric. "Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional 
Court." Columbia Human Rights Law Review 38.2 (2007): n. pag. Print. 
32 
 
These were the arguments in the minds of the NP drew upon when they opposed the 
inclusion of these rights in the Constitution. At the heart of these concerns though was the ANC 
vision of the Bill of Rights, which would have the ability to upset the status quo that apartheid 
had left, one that preserved socioeconomic privilege for white South Africans and specifically 
Afrikaners even more than it harmed all non-white South Africans. Rights that would alter the 
domestic distribution of wealth were a direct threat the privilege of this demographic. 50 
The Interim Constitution was in effect from the first free and open non-racial elections in 
South Africa in 1994 until 1996 when the final constitution was approved. It was intended to be 
merely a framework document for governing the country during the period leading up to 
elections and the subsequent drafting of the final constitution.  In it, there were few 
socioeconomic rights provisions. Additionally, these rights were not explicitly mentioned in the 
Thirty-four Principles that would shape the new Constitution.  This is mostly attributed to the 
strength of the negotiating position of the NP in the initial stages of the drafting. It is also due to 
the fact that the negotiating parties, as they neared the end of the completion period of the 
Interim constitution, simply postponed some of the more contentious issues so that they could 
proceed with long delayed democratic elections. 51 
Following said election, the ANC was the dominant political force of country, garnering 
over 60% of the popular vote. With this support and their past commitment to include 
socioeconomic rights in the Constitution, the ANC brought the issue back to prominence within 
the Constitutional Assembly. Though the National Party and the Democratic Party were the main 
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opposition to such rights, the ANC carried more political clout. The ANC was further supported 
by the Public Participation Programme, an ambitious and popular public education and 
involvement program that gathered submissions and comments from a variety of domestic 
groups on what should be included in the final Constitution. According to the Constitutional 
Assembly, “jobs, houses, the need to end crime and violence and better education” were the 
primary concerns for most South Africans”52 
As the two year drafting window came to a close, the debates in the Constitutional 
Assembly focused on sharply divisive issues such as minority education, labor issues, and 
provincial power. 53 The enshrining of socioeconomic rights in the constitution had seemingly 
been recognized as a forgone conclusion because of the popular support of South Africans, the 
dominance of the ANC, and an overwhelming desire to “give real hope in legal form to those 
without hope.”54 
The Constitution of South Africa Act was approved with an overwhelming affirmative 
vote in the constitutional referendum. It has been described as a masterpiece of post conflict 
constitutional engineering in the post-cold war era, and this has remained the popular narrative. 
Designed in the context of South Africa’s transition to democratic rule which started with the 
release of Mandela in February 1990, the constitution completely reconfigured South Africa’s 
political institutions, injected new dynamics, resulted in transformative changes across the 
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political landscape, and effectively ended decades of oppressive white minority rule. The 
Constitution has since been amended sixteen times but remains the basic law of the nation. 
Within it there are specific socioeconomic provisions, most explicitly in sections 26-29, which 
read: 
26 Housing  
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve   
the progressive realisation of this right.  
27 Health care, food, water and social security  
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to- 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate 
social assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
28 Children  
(1) Every child has the right-(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services . . .  
29 Education  
(1) Everyone has the right- 
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and  
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available 
and accessible.55 
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This chapter has sought to explain the origin and history of the struggle for socioeconomic rights 
in the South African Constitution as well as provide the conventional wisdom surrounding 
socioeconomic rights at the conception of the Constitution, arguments that still hold weight in 
South Africa to this day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Development and Progress of a Socioeconomic Jurisprudence 
 The South African Constitutional Court came into existence at a trying and exciting time 
for the new democracy. By including socioeconomic rights in the Constitution, the writers had 
given the country a mission to strive towards throwing off the inequality that years of apartheid 
rule had engrained so deeply in the social and economic fabric of the country. The courts came 
into being with many arguments about what it should or should not do, especially in the realm of 
socioeconomic rights. In addition, it had to develop its own jurisprudence around such rights, as 
the judges were working in a new area that had not been substantially adjudicated on before. 
This chapter will look at how the Court worked to address the numerous questions surrounding 
socioeconomic rights as well as what a number of landmark court cases such as Soobramoney, 
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Grootboom, TAC, Olivia Rd, Thubalisha Homes, and Mazibuko have done to shape the 
understood jurisprudence around socioeconomic rights in South Africa today.  
 Before the Court could start ruling on socioeconomic cases and developing this 
jurisprudence though, it had to address and review the legitimacy of the new South African 
Constitution that was brought before it in 1996. The Court had to determine whether the 
Constitution was in adherence to the Thirty-four Principles, which were agreed upon by the NP, 
the ANC, and the other negotiating political parties at CODESA.  These principles were strong 
guides to the writing of the Constitution, as they explicitly required or prohibited certain 
elements in the final draft. When the Constitution was brought before the Court so that it could 
rule on whether or not it adhered to and met the Thirty-four Principles, the Court had to answer 
many who critiqued the placement of socioeconomic rights in the Constitution as well as decide 
whether these rights should be included in the final Constitution. 
 There were a variety of groups that filed arguments in opposition to the inclusion of 
socioeconomic rights. These included the South African Institute for Race Relations, the Free 
Market Foundation, and the Gauteng Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.56 
These arguments generally centered on the core contentions that socioeconomic rights were not 
universally accepted fundamental rights, were not justiciable, and that they violated the 
constitutional separation of powers by intruding into the legislative and executive arena. These 
concerns echoed the contentions of the NP mentioned in the previous chapter. 
                                               
56
 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa v. n/a. 26 Southern African Legal Information Institute. 
Constitutional Court of South  Africa. 1996. Print.  paras. 76-78 
37 
 
 When the Court certified the South African Constitution it addressed these contentions. 
First, the Court had already held that “universally accepted rights” such as those in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights did not make up the ceiling for human rights, but rather  served as 
a floor, which could be added to or built upon by the Constitutional Assembly with a variety of 
“other rights that were not universally accepted.”57 In relation to the other two objections that 
were filed, the lack of justicability and the violation of the separation of powers, the court held 
that: 
“We are of the view that [social] rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable..many of the civil and 
political rights entrenched in the [proposed constitutional text] will give rise to similar budgetary 
implications without compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio economic rights will almost 
inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.”58  
In addition, the Court stated that:  
“At the very minimum, socioeconomic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion” In doing 
so the Court delineated a floor of minimum justiciability, in that it would not permit government 
interference with access to social rights. Finally, in response to the argument relating to the violation of 
separation of powers, the Court held that, “it cannot be said that by including socioeconomic rights..a task 
is conferred upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred on them…that it results in a breach 
of the separation of powers.”  
By this it is meant that courts are usually given controversial matters on which they must rule 
and it will generally impact the legislature. This does not stand at odds with the traditional 
separation of powers, but is an important mechanism in the system of checks and balances, 
which is why the court dismisses this claim simply and without much analysis.  
 The significance of this is that it began to illuminate the Court’s view of socioeconomic 
rights, answered some of the critiques of socioeconomic rights, and permitted the inclusion of 
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socioeconomic rights in the final text of the South African Constitution. While the court had 
been able (to a certain extent) to answer the questions on justicability, there was still the looming 
question of enforceability that they had not addressed.  The first opportunity to do so would 
come two years later in the first substantive socioeconomic case that the Court was presented 
with- Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal (Soobramoney). 
 
Soobramoney 
Soobramoney involved a challenge to the resource rationing strategy of a state run 
hospital. This resource rationing policy caused Mr. Soobramoney, the claimant in the case, to be 
denied treatment (access to dialysis) because he suffered from chronic renal failure. He was not a 
candidate for a kidney transplant, and as such, he would need kidney dialysis for the rest of his 
life to prolong it, even though his condition was incurable. The KwaZulu Natal Department of 
Health’s policy involved the limiting of access to dialysis to people suffering from acute or 
chronic renal failure while they were awaiting a kidney transplant. According to the Department 
of Health this was necessary to make sure that those kidneys could be cured had the best chance 
of living, eventually without dialysis.  Mr. Soobramoney argued that the policy violated his right 
not to be refused emergency medical treatment, or alternatively, his right to life.  The right to not 
be refused medical treatment fell under Section 27(3) of the Constitution and in the alternative he 
argued it breached his right of access to healthcare services in section 27 (1) (a). 59 
 The Court unanimously rejected both of these claims. The claim under Section 27(3) was 
rejected because Mr. Soobramoney sought treatment for an ongoing and chronic medical 
                                               
59Pieterse, Marius. "Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights: Contemplating the South African 
Experience." Human Rights Quarterly 26.4 (2004): 882-905. Print.. 
39 
 
condition. The Court held that Section 27(3) was intended to provide medical services for 
someone who is in a sudden and catastrophic medical situation that calls for immediate attention.  
In this event, they should not be denied services such as an ambulance or access to a hospital that 
would be able to provide the needed treatment. 60 The Court then chose to base its judgment on 
the right to have access to healthcare in section 27 (1) (a). The Court found that due to the 
rationality of the rationing policy, it could not be shown that the state was in violation of its 
constitutional duties.  In doing so, the court showed deference to the administrative mechanisms 
that had imagined and implemented the rationing policy. Writing for the majority of the Court, J 
Chaskalson wrote that, “a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good 
faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters.”61 This demonstrates a conscious practice of judicial deference on the part of the Court. 
 It isn’t difficult to justify the Court’s decision. Healthcare rationing is widespread in all 
states, and to a certain extent, unavoidable.  In any situation involving Mr.Soobramoney’s claim, 
it would be hard (aside from a challenge to where resources were being allocated) to fault the 
idea that it is more logical or “rational” to treat those who can be cured rather than those who 
cannot.  In this case the Court, in outlining its jurisprudence, was confronted with the challenge 
of developing some sort of model for the enforcement of the positive duties imposed by Section 
27 of the Constitution.  
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Tellingly, the Court rejected the idea that this Section imposed a direct and immediate 
burden on the state to provide healthcare, or services in general, to anyone on demand. In doing 
so, the Court addressed the concerns of people that thought justiciable socioeconomic rights 
would place too much of a demand on states that could not afford, quite literally, to realize them. 
The Court also demonstrated its reluctance to step too far into the territory of the legislature or 
executive, by indicating that it would be slow to interfere with programs that are undertaken in 
“good faith”. Additionally the Court brought to the forefront the idea of rationality. To be 
justifiable, a decision to limit healthcare or other programs in general needs only to be rational. 
This notion would emerge in greater detail in Grootboom but this is the place where it makes its 
first appearance. The Court’s overall approach illuminated its reluctance to dive into the 
substantive nature of socioeconomic rights, such as determining what entitlements might fall 
within the scope of the right to access to healthcare. By deciding not to address socioeconomic 
rights substantively, they also side stepped the potential issue of having to indicate how these 
entitlements might impact how the state had to allocate its resources.  
In an overall minimalist approach, the Court did not attack socioeconomic rights as 
substantively as many detractors might have feared. Instead they took a cautious and nuanced 
approach, choose not to make a substantive ruling on entitlements, instead deferring to the 
Ministry of Health, and brought the issue of rationality to prominence. Yet the Court 
sympathized with the plight of Mr. Soobramoney. To end his concurring judgment, J Sachs 
wrote:  
“The applicant in this case presented his claim in a most dignified manner and showed manifest 
appreciation for the situation of the many other persons in the same harsh circumstances as himself. If 
resources were co-extensive with compassion, I have no doubt as to what my decision would have been. 
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Unfortunately, the resources are limited, and I can find no reason to interfere with the allocation undertaken 
by those better equipped than I to deal with the agonising choices that had to be made.”62  
The idea of rationality raised in Soobramoney would be tackled more expansively in the next 
seminal case to come before the Court.  
Grootboom 
The next substantive case to come before the Court in 2001, five years after 
Soobramoney, was Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene Grootboom and Others 
(Grootboom). During this period there was lethargic economic progress and an increase in crime 
and violence for many poor South Africans. There was an acute lack of economic opportunity 
and a vast proportion of South Africans were living in poverty. Many had hoped that the Court 
would take a more active role in the advancement of socioeconomic rights, but thus far, this hope 
had come to naught. J Sachs during these years actually acknowledged “the harsh reality that the 
Constitutions promise of dignity and equality for all remains for many but a distant dream”63In 
Grootboom the Court took a more expansive approach to the socioeconomic rights adjudication.  
Grootboom concerned the adjudication of socioeconomic rights in relation to housing 
rights. The facts in the case are representative of the all too often failings of the South African 
housing infrastructure. The applicants in Grootboom became homeless when they were required 
to leave an informal, or squatter, settlement which was located on private land that had been 
selected for the construction of low-income housing, sponsored by the state. The eviction 
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affected 510 children and 390 adults who joined resident Irene Grootboom’s suit over the matter. 
They were forcefully evicted from their new informal settlement, while their possessions were 
burned and their homes destroyed. When Irene Grootboom brought her suit forward national, 
provincial, and local governments challenged an order from the Cape High Court which held that 
the relevant government bodies had met their constitutional duty under Section 26(housing) but 
had failed to meet their duties under Section 28 (minimum services for children). The High Court 
held that the “spirit” of Section 28 required that the order “should take account of the need of the 
child to be accompanied by his or her parent” and thus a parent was to accompany the child in 
the shelter provided.64 As a result the High Court found that the evictees should be temporarily 
provided with adequate shelter until they were permanently set up with housing through a 
provincial housing plan.  
 The Government of the Republic of South Africa appealed to the Constitutional 
Court and the Court unanimously overturned the High Court decision. It found that “neither 
section 26 nor section 28 entitles the respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately upon 
demand”65 but also that the community’s right to access to adequate housing under Section 
26(2)66 of the Constitution had been violated. This was, in essence, because the relevant 
provincial government’s housing plan did not pass the threshold of reasonableness imagined by 
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the Court in Section 26(2) of the Constitution.67 The Court recognized that housing was “a 
constitutional issue of fundamental importance to the development of South Africa’s new 
Constitutional order. 68 Yet housing still remained unavailable to many South Africans.”69 The 
Court first stipulated that state’s negative obligation to housing would cause it to “desist from 
preventing or impairing the right of access to housing”70 The more important aspect of the ruling 
though focused on the positive obligations of the state. The Court focused on three aspects of 
Section 26. It called for legislative, as well as other measures to address the situation, recognized 
the limitations of available resources, and finally, permitted progressive realization. The Court 
then combined these three aspects in a reasonableness analysis, which was essentially a more 
detailed extension of the idea of rationality that it had put forward in Soobramoney.   
It then applied this analysis to the state housing program, where this time it was 
confronted not with a matter of resource allocation within an existing program but the lack of a 
program altogether for the immediate needs of evicted individuals. The failure of the state in this 
instance was identified as its lack of a program to take any steps to assist those in desperate and 
immediate housing need. The Court, in keeping with its approach in Soobramoney, rejected the 
contention that the right to housing had any interpretive content independent of the duty to take 
reasonable measures for its realization. Specifically, the Court rejected an interpretive approach 
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based on the idea that socioeconomic rights had a minimum core of content. This idea was based 
on the Convention for Economic and Social Rights General Comment 3 on the nature of states 
parties’ obligations under the ICESCR and stipulated that socioeconomic rights consisted of a 
basket of goods and services to which all rights bearers were entitled.71 Writing the judgment of 
the Court, J Yacoob stated: 
“The determination of a minimum core in the context of “the right to have access to adequate 
housing” presents difficult questions. This is so because the needs in the context of access to adequate 
housing are diverse: there are those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need 
financial assistance. There are difficult questions relating to the definition of minimum core in the context 
of a right to have access to adequate housing, in particular whether the minimum core obligation should be 
defined generally or with regard to specific groups of people. As will appear from the discussion below, the 
real question in terms of our Constitution is whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right 
afforded by section 26 are reasonable. There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have 
regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the state 
are reasonable. However, even if it were appropriate to do so, it could not be done unless sufficient 
information is placed before a court to enable it to determine the minimum core”72 
The Court found that the state’s primary obligation under Section 26 of the Constitution 
was largely to adopt and implement a reasonable policy within its resource capacity that would 
ensure access to housing over an extended period of time. The Court then devoted much of its 
judgement to the idea of reasonableness previously mentioned, further embellishing it. The Court 
held that, to be “reasonable”, a state housing policy must: 
• Be comprehensive, coherent, and effective ( para 40) 
• Have sufficient regard for social, economic and historical context of widespread deprivation(para 
43) 
• Have sufficient regard for the availability of the state’s resources (para 46) 
• Make short, medium, and long term provisions for housing needs (para 43) 
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• Give special attention to the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable(para 42) 
• Be aimed at lowering administrative, operational, and financial barriers over time. (para 45) 
• Allocate responsibilities and tasks clearly to all three spheres of government(para 39) 
• Be implemented reasonably, adequately resourced and free of bureaucratic inefficient or onerous 
regulations (para 42) 
• Respond with care and concern to the needs of the most desperate (para 44) and; 
• Achieve more than a mere statistical advance in the numbers of people accessing housing, by 
demonstrating that the needs of the most valuable are catered for. (para 44)73 
The Court held that the reasonableness of measures are determined by the context they are 
undertaken in.  It also found that the minimum core argument that was laid our previously could 
possibly be relevant to what is reasonable in a given context, but would not be determinative of 
that state action in such a case. This reasonableness standard taken in a contextualized account is 
significant. It allowed the court to develop a meaningful interpretive scheme by which it could 
evaluate state action, while also allowing it to steer away from developing concrete entitlements 
of widespread application.  With this in mind, the court held the current housing system 
unreasonably neglected to consider and address those most in need. The program “fell short of 
constitutional compliance” because it “failed to devise and implement within its available 
resources a comprehensive and coordinated program progressively to realize the right of access 
to adequate housing.”74 The Court then proceeded to issue a declaratory order that required the 
state to remedy this failure. The Human Rights Commission of South Africa was assigned to 
monitor and report of the status of the implementation intermittently. Furthermore, the Court 
gave some direct guidance to what the plan might look like, when it said that the program should 
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be implemented “to provide relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their 
heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.”75 
 There are a number of important developments to examine within the context of this case. 
Arguably, the most important aspect of this case is the reasonableness standard that the Court 
developed. Many have compared the Court’s development of this standard as a retreat into 
administrative law.76 Yet, in a necessary transition away from a traditional and formalistic view 
of law to the transformative approach of the new Constitution, this is not necessarily a negative. 
The Courts falling back upon principles of administrative law makes sense because in many legal 
systems, the review of administrative policy involves striking a difficult balance between judicial 
activism and judicial deference. In retreating to the comfort zone of administrative law, the Court 
made an important gain in Grootboom- it laid out what it considers to be an appropriate role for 
itself in adjudicating the multilayered and connected issues raised by claimed violations of 
socioeconomic rights. In this way, socioeconomic rights are vindicated in not being as far 
removed from courts “traditional” function of review, and therefore their justicability is not 
nearly as implausible. Additionally, the reasonableness standard gave the Court a specific and 
outlined way to consider the policy of the state and its accordance with the Constitution. This is 
something that the Court would use going forward, and is one of the major takeaways from this 
case.  
 Secondly the Court substantially rejected the idea of a minimum core of rights and the 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights through this means.  The idea of the UN in formulating a 
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minimum core was to set a “floor” for rights, but such an idea was robustly rejected by the Court. 
While the ruling of Grootboom did result in the formulation of a national emergency housing 
policy and gave poor people a means to resist eviction, the Court did not issue any order to 
directly address the situations of the plaintiffs. The Court stated that neither of the rights 
violations “entitles the respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.”77 
The UN idea of a minimum core was deciphered through a multi-year study by the UN 
Committee of country reports submitted by its state signatories. The Court rejects creation of a 
similar core for South Africa because the Court lacks the same resources as the UN with which 
to conduct such a study. While the Court rejects this procedure and ultimately rejects the idea of 
a minimum core, it does agree with the UN Committee in the necessity for a determination in 
“regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to protection of the right in 
question.”78 
 These were two of the main ideas to come of the Court’s decision and further embellish 
its developing jurisprudence. While  many consider this the peak of the Court’s action, because it 
resulted in a national housing policy, added a contextualized element to court evaluations of 
policy, and gave evictees a line of reasoning with which to resist eviction, the limits of the 
Court’s ability to enforce such decisions in the future is still unclear. The Court was well aware 
they were building a jurisprudence that had not been attempted before, and the result was “a 
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cautiously crafted opinion.”79 So what would the case of Grootboom be? Would it be the farthest 
extent to which the Court would go for enforceability? Or would it be a small step towards a 
more expansive jurisprudence? The following case, TAC, shows the Court is willing to go 
further, while later cases call this idea into question.  
TAC 
 The TAC case, or Minister of Health v.s. Treatment Action Campaign, came before the Court in 
2002 and has proved to be one of the Court’s more forceful rulings. A group of NGO’s, led by 
the Treatment Action Campaign, challenged a government health policy that related to the 
prevention of HIV transmission from mother to child.  The drug Nevirapine had been shown to 
drastically decrease the chances that a mother who contracted HIV would transmit the deadly 
virus to her child in the midst of childbirth. The manufacturer of the drug was providing it to the 
South African government for free for five years. In the midst of this window, the government 
created a program for distributing the drug. The government would distribute it at a limited 
number of pilot sites, of which there would be two in each of South Africa’s eleven provinces. 
Doctors outside of these pilot distribution sites were barred from distributing this drug, even 
though it had previously been rigorously tested and approved for widespread use. The 
government stated that it planned to conduct a multi-year study and analysis of the drug before 
implementing a national plan. Meanwhile, only ten percent of the estimated 70,000 annual births 
that involved the transmission of HIV were affected or covered by the approved pilot sites. 80 
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 The TAC challenged this program on the basis that it violated the state’s constitutional 
obligation to “respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights,, especially 
when these rights in question related to the right of access to health care services for pregnant 
women and children.”81  The TAC requested that the Court lift the barring of the distribution of 
Nevirapine outside of those sites included in the pilot program and that it issue an order requiring 
the government to immediately create an expansive national program. In a far reaching 
judgment, arguably its farthest reaching to date, the court granted both requests.  
 The Court ordered that the government make the drug Nevirapine available outside of the 
designated pilot sites. It also ordered that the drug be administered in public hospitals for cases in 
which doing so was medically indicated and where there was the capacity to provide HIV testing 
and counseling as well as the administration of the drug. The government was instructed to 
remove bureaucratic restrictions that prevented the drug from being administered in these 
circumstances. The Court found that the government had breached the right of access to health 
care services under Section 27 of the constitution. In its opinion the Court referenced a large 
amount of information, drawn “from a variety of specialized perspectives, ranging from 
pediatrics, pharmacology and epidemiology to public health administration, economics and 
statistics”82 
 Then the Court applied the reasonableness test that it had developed in Grootboom to 
TAC , finding that the governments goals did not justify the lack of  impact the pilot program had 
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on the vast majority of South African women and children for whom HIV treatment  was needed. 
The drugs proven effectiveness, the fact that the human and financial capital were available to 
administer it, and the vulnerability of poor mothers and children all contributed to the finding 
that the government policy was unreasonable. Specifically, the Court in its judgment stated that: 
“The Government policy was an inflexible one that denied mothers and their newborn children…a 
potentially lifesaving drug..It could have been administered within the available resources of the State 
without any known harm to mother or child..The policy of government..constitutes a breach of the State’s 
obligation under Section 27(2) read with Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution”83 
 Subjected to a high level of scrutiny, the government argument in TAC ultimately did not 
hold up.  The Court ordered extensive remedies and actions to be taken on behalf of the 
government to rectify the breach of rights it found. This ruling came closest to either the 
nightmare scenario  of judicial overreach that critics of socioeconomic rights predicted or, as 
argued by supporters, the judicial realization of the transformative values found in the 
Constitution. In this case, the Court further developed the reasonableness standard it created in 
Grootboom, applying it to an even greater extent on government policy and finding that said 
policy did not meet the criteria of the standard.  
In essence, this is one of the most important developments to come out of these three 
landmark cases of Soobramoney, Grootboom, and TAC. The Court’s borrowing of a 
reasonableness standard from administrative law has “enabled it to forge remedies for 
socioeconomic rights claimants without much transformative adjudication, at least at the 
interpretive level”.84 The reasonableness standard is sufficiently flexible to enable the Court to 
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defer to the executive’s choices in policy (as was the case in Soobramoney) or on the other hand 
outline the purposes of specific socioeconomic rights much more distinctly(which occurred in 
Grootboom).  
Two other developments that the case of TAC reinforced were the idea of judicial 
restraint and the unequivocal dismissal of the idea that the Court should only issue declaratory 
orders. In this ruling, even with the strong stance of the Court, judicial restraint was evident as 
the court rejected a request for ongoing judicial oversight of the governments HIV treatment 
programs. The Court also did not push forward a lower court’s order that the state provide infant 
formula to poor mothers. In regards to this, the Court stated: 
“We do not consider it appropriate to deal with the use of formula feed in the order. Whether it is desirable 
to use this substitute rather than breastfeeding raises complex issues, particularly when the mother 
concerned may not have easy access to clean water or the ability to adopt a bottle-feeding regimen because 
of her personal circumstances. The result of the studies conducted at the research and training sites may 
enable government to formulate a comprehensive policy in this regard. In the meantime this must be left to 
health professionals to address during counselling. We do not consider that there is sufficient evidence to 
justify an order that formula feed must be made available by the government on request and without charge 
in every case.”85 
This stipulation, along with client counseling, were the most expensive aspects of the 
lower court’s order.  The Court found that there was not enough evidence to justify an order that 
the government had to provide formula upon request and free of charge in every case. There is 
the implication here though that such an order does not overstep the reach of the authority of the 
Court. In this instance, the Court was just unable to obtain the necessary facts to make such an 
order in this context. So while the Court engaged in judicial restraint, it alluded to the fact that it 
might not always in the future.  
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Finally, the Court soundly rejected the government’s argument that the courts were not 
empowered to issue any order other than a declaration of rights in complicated and multifaceted 
socioeconomic matters. This addressed any lingering critics that might have argued the non-
justiciable nature of these rights. The Court acknowledged that it was not ideally suited to issues 
orders that had a plethora of consequences and that the judicial role in matters such as these 
should be “rather restrained and focused” 86 while also highlighting its role in requiring the state 
to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and subjecting these measures to critical 
examination to assure their reasonableness. In fact that Court stated that: 
“Insofar as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the Executive, that is an intrusion mandated by 
the Constitution itself. There is also no merit in the argument that a distinction should be drawn between 
declaratory and mandatory orders against government. Even simple declaratory orders against government 
or organs of the State can affect their policy and may well have budgetary implications. Government is 
constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the 
resources to do so.”87 
The result of this ruling is the view that the Court is, contrary to the belief of some, not 
rendered powerless by the doctrine of separation of powers when tasked with the domestic 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Whereas traditionally courts have been hesitant to affect 
and jar the budgetary and policy processes, the judgment of TAC shows that socioeconomic 
rights are as capable of vindication as civil and political rights.  
Taken together, these three initial landmark cases tell us much about how the Court chose 
to begin to build its unique jurisprudence. In Soobramoney  the Court laid the foundation for the 
reasonableness standard by utilizing the idea of rationality in its ruling. It also showed judicial 
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restraint and deference to the State in taking their plan in good faith, while simultaneously tacitly 
objecting to the idea of a minimum core of socioeconomic rights as laid out in the ICESR. In 
Grootboom the courts codified the idea of rationality into a reasonableness standard by falling 
back onto administrative law as a way to measure the justice of state policy. It also took steps 
forward by explicitly rejecting a core minimum of rights in much stronger language than what it 
had used previously. In this case, the result ended up being a new national housing policy. 
Finally, in TAC, the Court issued one if its most directive rulings. It answered questions about 
whether the Court could issue more than simply declaratory orders by issuing orders requiring 
certain action from the executive. In this case, it forced the executive to expand its program to a 
much larger cross section of the country. In this way, it showed in some sense that the Court does 
have “teeth”, or enforcement mechanisms, when it comes to socioeconomic rights issues. In 
summary, the Court has demonstrated it will sometimes choose to be directive, that it will 
generally defer to the state when it comes to policy development, it rejects a core minimum of 
rights, stating instead that rights should be implemented gradually, and that the Court has 
developed a standard for measuring the reasonableness of State policy.  Yet there are many 
questions still remaining. How far will the Court go in its enforcement of the rights it protects? 
Will the Court ever articulate a substantive ruling on these rights, articulating what entitlements 
they entail? Will their rulings have a tangible impact on the large population of poor people in 
South Africa? The Constitution assigns the power to determine the meaning of socioeconomic 
rights not to the legislature, but to the Court itself, and still the Court has appeared hesitant to 
enact this power. While the Court has done much, there are still avenues of socioeconomic rights 
it has not explored. Arguably, the TAC case represented the strongest push the Court has made 
for the realization of these rights. In a second wave of cases, the Court fleshed out other aspects 
54 
 
of its jurisprudence. The cases which will be discussed next came after these foundational cases 
and show both the growth and perceived regression of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
As the Court held in TAC, socioeconomic rights do not “give rise to a self-standing and 
independent positive right”88 that is enforceable regardless of whether the State’s policies to 
realize the right are reasonable. The prospects for individual claimants who are seeking specific 
benefits, in light of the previous statement, are less than optimistic and therefore the incentive to 
litigate is fairly low. A result of this is that the next few court cases outlined have exclusively 
been brought by, or in coordination with, a small number of organizations and movements 
working to vindicate the interests of groups. The following cases have also required a thorough 
knowledge of state policy so that a case might be successfully framed in relation to the 
reasonableness standard. Movement building and legal strategizing between these groups takes 
time, and this could be one explanation for the three and a half years, from 2005 to 2008, in 
which the Court did not rule on any socioeconomic cases.  
 
Olivia Rd 
In February of 2008, the case of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd v. City of Johannesburg 
(Olivia Rd) came before the Court and placed socioeconomic rights again at the forefront of the 
Courts decision making. Hundreds of incredibly poor individuals came before the Court to have 
an order that they be evicted from buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg, which the city 
alleged to be unfit to live in, revoked.  While the occupiers of these buildings, the claimants, 
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admitted that the condition of the buildings were problematic, they argued that these buildings 
were the only thing standing between them and being homeless. In spite of this the City had 
refused to provide or offer the occupiers with alternative housing or support. The response of the 
occupiers was to claim that if this was the case the order for their eviction should not have been 
granted by the South African Court of Appeals.  
They also claimed that the City’s procedure for evicting them was only part of a grander 
strategy to remove close to 67,000 people from 235 supposedly unsafe buildings in inner city 
Johannesburg. There was no plan by which the City would provide alternative accommodations 
for these people when the evictions went through.  According to the occupiers, the lack of a plan 
to provide alternative housing or accommodation was a violation of section 26(2) of the 
Constitution. They then went one step further and asked the Court to oversee the creation of a 
reasonable housing policy through a structural interdict. A structural interdict: 
“is an extreme remedy and should be applied only in cases where there are no other judicial remedies 
capable of setting matters right. Structural interdicts represent an assertion of judicial power that goes 
significantly beyond that of propitiatory and mandatory interdicts. Structural interdicts involve the court 
itself in ongoing supervision of an institutional or public agency as a last resort. Most acutely, structural 
interdicts may involve courts in budgetary questions and raise difficult issues of the legitimate limits of 
court power”89 
At the time that the case came before the Court, the City was actively taking steps to develop a 
housing policy for poor people in the city, but was still silent on the issue of providing alternative 
accommodation for those it evicted or planned to. 
 The Court observed that the first issue that the occupiers raised was the procedural 
unfairness of the very decision of the City to evict. The City had made little to no attempt to 
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figure out the housing needs of the occupiers or what the consequences of the eviction might be 
for those involved.  This, in addition to the City demonstrating its willingness to consider the 
demands for shelter by the occupiers at the time of the hearing, led the Court to do something it 
had never done before-issue an engagement order. This order effectively required the City and 
the occupiers to enter into negotiations and “engage meaningfully” in such a way as to attempt to 
solve the issue at hand. After this engagement, a solution was reached according to which the 
occupiers would vacate the condemned buildings in return for guaranteed housing in a property 
managed by the City elsewhere in inner Johannesburg.  The rent for these individuals would be 
25% of their income and they would be allowed to occupy these properties until permanent 
accommodation became available. 
The vast majority of the Court’s decision focused on the concept of “meaningful 
engagement” and what it means in the context of socioeconomic rights. According to the Court, 
it is linked to reasonableness and because of this, a procedural requirement of Section 26(2). The 
Court held that before seeking an eviction, the state is required to show that is has engaged on 
multiple levels with the evictees who might become homeless due to the eviction and respond 
reasonably to the issues and concerns raised in the process of engagement. While the Court did 
not pin down what such a response might look like, it did lay out that there were a range of 
remedies that existed between the poles of providing alternative accommodation and providing 
nothing.  The Court held that: 
“Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increased 
understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the process. People about to 
be evicted may be so vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the importance of engagement and 
may refuse to take part in this process. If this happens, a municipality cannot walk away without more. It 
must take reasonable efforts to engage and it is only if these efforts fail that a municipality may proceed 
without appropriate engagement. It is precisely to ensure that a city is able to engage meaningfully with the 
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poor, vulnerable, or illiterate people that the engagement process should preferably [be] managed by 
careful and sensitive people on its side.”90 
There are a couple of points to note that came out of the case of Olivia Rd, but the most 
important is certainly the creation of the idea of meaningful engagement. It added another way 
for the Court to add to the reasonableness standard while also creating a space in which concrete 
entitlements could be negotiated and implemented by contractual agreement. This was a 
significant resource for the poor. As a prerequisite for eviction it provides a resource through 
which the community can rally and plead its case. It also reinforces the proceduralisation of 
socioeconomic rights.  
 Additionally though, this case also reiterated the reluctance of the Court to take a 
substantive view of rights. It chose not to ground its ruling on the right to housing in substantive 
norms, which would define what a right to housing might entail, but instead further extended the 
reasonableness standard, which while useful, does not help define what, for example, a 
reasonable response to homelessness may be. Indeed, the Court indicated, as pointed out earlier, 
that in some cases the reasonable response to such a situation might be not providing any 
alternative accommodation at all. Another issue is that without a substantive view of housing 
rights, the group that the state is engaging meaningfully with does not have an idea of what it can 
reasonably expect. This puts the group at risk to be the recipients of a predetermined state policy 
that might not be appropriate or address their needs.  
Thubelisha Homes 
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The next landmark case to come before the Court was the case of Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others (Thubelisha Homes). The case 
included more than 20,000 people who lived in the informal settlement of Joe Slovo outside of 
Cape Town, who were appealing to the Court to set aside an order for their eviction, which had 
been granted by the Cape High Court. The eviction had been brought forward by a number of 
parties including Thubelisha Homes, the Minister of Housing, and the Member of Executive 
Committee (MEC) for Housing in the Western Cape. These parties argued that the community 
must be evicted in order for the N2 Gateway housing project to be implemented and carried out.  
The N2 Gateway housing project was the development and construction of formal housing for 
poor families on the site of the informal settlement. Thubelisha Homes was the housing company 
that the state employed to complete the project and they applied for the occupier’s eviction in 
order to do so. We can imagine that the company kept the Grootboom ruling in mind because 
they planned to provide temporary accommodation about 15 kilometers away in a housing 
development near Delft until they could be provided with permanent housing.  Importantly 
though, Thubelisha Homes did not ensure that the occupiers, upon the completion Of the N2 
Gateway development, would be assured permanent housing in the project. In fact, they were 
unable to say where or when the occupiers would be provided with permanent housing post-
relocation. 
 The occupiers focused their protest on three general arguments. First, they claimed that 
they were not illegal occupiers, and therefore could not be evicted from their location. Second, 
the eviction was being pursued in order to avoid complying with their expectations that 70% of 
the houses in the N2 Gateway development would be reserved for them. Third and lastly, they 
claimed the eviction had been sought without the meaningful engagement that the Court had 
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outlined in Olivia Rd. Of particular issue here was the lack of dialogue around the option of 
upgrading the settlement of Joe Slovo without disturbing it and relocating the inhabitants. The 
evictees also argued that the eviction, if carried out, would cause acute hardship because the site 
which they were to be relocated to lacked a number of standard social amenities, including 
hospitals and schools. It also took them a great distance from their access to employment, and 
therefore their livelihoods. If they had to travel the distance from the proposed temporary 
accommodation to work each day, their cost of commuting would likely double, adding up to 
more than half of their already meager monthly salaries.  
 The Court took ten months to decide on its ruling and then delivered 5 separate 
judgments. To the surprise of some though, the Court unanimously affirmed the eviction order. J 
Sachs in his concurring judgment writes: 
“In my view, prior to the institution of the present proceedings, the applicants were aware that Joe Slovo 
was going to be upgraded and decent houses were to be built in accordance with the N2 Gateway Project, a 
policy that was adopted to upgrade all informal settlements. The residents of Joe Slovo, including many of 
the applicants, embraced this Project. And they knew that they would have to relocate to temporary 
relocation units (TRUs) in order to allow the project to be implemented. Indeed, when they were requested 
to relocate, a considerable number of the residents relocated voluntarily to Delft. At the time of the 
institution of these proceedings, the applicants, who did not relocate, therefore knew that they had no 
consent to remain on the land. The applicants were, therefore, at the time of instituting these proceedings, 
unlawful residents of Joe Slovo within the meaning of PIE. All my colleagues at least agree that this was 
the position.”91 
This was on the condition that the eviction was staggered out over a period of 45 weeks, ensured 
that social amenities such as clinics and schools were provided at the relocation site, and the 
Court laid down rigorous conditions as to the services and nature of the houses that would be 
provided at the relocation site of Delft. The housing at Delft also had to be ready and available at 
the time of eviction. The Court also directed the government to fulfill the occupier’s expectations 
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that 70 percent of the houses in the new housing project would be allocated to the relocated 
residents upon its completion, which Thubelisha Homes had already conceded at the hearing of 
the issue.  J O’Regan wrote that: 
“I have no doubt that the occupants would prefer to stay at Joe Slovo because it is convenient and 
constitutes a community where they feel at home. This view is worthy of respect but it is indisputable that 
the situation at Joe Slovo is undesirable and unacceptable and cannot be a long-term solution. The 
alternative accommodation which must be provided to those who must move from Joe Slovo must meet 
basic standards, as stipulated in the order. Moreover, the respondents are asked to engage meaningfully 
with the applicants concerning issues relating to transport between Delft, and the occupiers’ places of work 
and education, as well as clinics. The solution may be far from ideal, but in the circumstances I have not 
been persuaded that it is not just or equitable.”92 
The government also had to engage with individual households currently living in Joe Slovo and 
report back to the Court at regular intervals as to the progress of the eviction order.  
 As of today, the eviction has not been carried out, and the Joe Slovo Settlement still lies 
at the base of Table Mountain outside of Cape Town. In light of the hearing of the case and the 
10 months that passed before the judgment was handed down the Western Cape Provincial 
Government, which controlled funding of subsidized housing in the province, passed hands from 
the African National Congress to the Democratic Alliance. The Democratic Alliance had long 
been critical of the N2 Gateway project and soon after coming to power agreed to revisit the 
issue of the relocation to Delft. The government then looked again into upgrading the existing 
settlement of Joe Slovo, long sought by the inhabitants, in large part because of the difficulty of 
meeting the stringent expectations for eviction the Court had laid out in its order.  
 The Court dealt with the issues at hand primarily on the basis of reasonableness. The 
question of  whether the eviction was just and equitable was boiled down to weighing variables 
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and deciding whether it was reasonable to evict some in order to help realize the right of access 
to adequate housing. Additionally, they split this question into two parts, the first of which was 
whether the eviction was reasonable in light of the lack of meaningful engagement and second 
whether it was reasonable in relation to the broader housing policy it was helping to implement. 
The Court found that the answer to both of these questions was yes, but there was only a small 
overlap in their disparate reasons for thinking so.  
 The separate judgments delivered by the justices concurred that the adequate housing at 
Delft that was stipulated by their order and the allocation of 70 percent of the newly constructed 
homes to the evictees were the primary reason that the eviction as considered reasonable, even 
though meaningful engagement had not occurred. The majority of the justices admitted that the 
relocation would be “an inevitably stressful process”93 that would “entail immense hardship. 
Yacoob J expressed their justification for this when he stated that “there are circumstances in 
which no choice but to undergo traumatic experiences so that we can be better off later”94.  
  By and large, the main developments to come out of this case were in reference to how 
the Court viewed its role in the case and then its enforcement of government promises in an 
authoritative way. The Court largely seemed to think of its role as ensuring the government 
implemented to best possible version of the policy that it had presented to them. Here, 
reasonableness was primarily about realizing the expectations of the Joe Slovo evictees in line 
with the state’s housing policy. That being said the role of the Court as the justices saw it was not 
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to decide the question of whether the policy put forward was appropriate to the communities 
objectively based needs. Yet, the Court was willing to require the government to abide by its 
own policy in terms of what that policy was supposed to provide and ensure these measures were 
implemented. This proved important because for practical and political reasons, the government 
was unable to implement to Court’s stringent orders. Subsequently, the government has reviewed 
the possibility of upgrading the Joe Slovo settlement itself, which was the original desire of its 
inhabitants. This had established one way that the Court can help give effect to socioeconomic 
rights concerns- by requiring the government to meet its promises and expectations as they were 
originally laid out. In this case, doing so prevented the evictions from occurring and caused the 
government to return to the occupier’s original wishes.  
Mazibuko 
The final case that will be reviewed is the case of Mazibuko and Others v. City of 
Johannesburg and Others (Mazibuko), which was decided in 2009. Five poor households from 
Phiri, Soweto, brought the case before the Court, arguing that the City of Johannesburg’s Free 
Basic Water (FBW) policy was unreasonable. The FBW policy limited the amount of free water 
to six kiloliters per household per month, regardless of the size of the household.  The 
households argued that such a policy was unreasonable due to the fact that it was unable to meet 
the needs of impoverished households, many of whom had many people living there. They 
argued that there were two reasons for this. Firstly the policy relied on a calculation of 25 liters 
per person per day. This was despite the fact that the Convention on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights set the international standard on water rights in General Comment 15 when it 
suggested that 50 liters per day was the minimum amount of water necessary to meet basic 
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human health and dignity needs. 95 Their second argument related to the large number of people 
that lived in poor multi -dwelling households.  The 6kl FBW policy was premised on a 
calculation of 8 people per household, yet in Phiri there were commonly over 15 people per 
household as most properties had multiple backyard shacks which they collected rent from and 
shared the monthly allocation of water.  
 The effect of the installation of prepayment meters, which cut of the flow of water after 
6kl and the implementation of the FWB policy, was that the households’ water supply cut off 
halfway through each month when they used up their 6kl. When they could not afford to pay for 
more water, which was usually the case, they had great difficulty engaging in everyday tasks, 
such as cooking, washing clothes, and health and sanitation needs. They challenged this result 
through a number of arguments: 
1. The FWB policy was not a reasonable policy capable of giving effect to the applicants right of 
access to sufficient water; 
2. The decision by Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd (Johannesburg Water) to install prepayment 
water meters in Phiri amounted to administrative action and, because it was taken without 
consultation, violated section 4(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000(PAJA) 
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3. The automatic disconnection of prepayment water meters violated section 4(3)(b) of the Water 
Services Act 108 of 1997 (Water Services Act), which requires reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to make representations prior to the limitations or discontinuation of water services96 
The Court was essentially had to consider whether the City’s FBW policy was reasonable in 
terms of section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution, which guaranteed everyone right of access to 
sufficient water. It also had to decide whether the installation of the prepayment meters was 
lawful. 
 The Court proceeded to reject the previous claims. It focused on the large amount of data 
the City presented demonstrating its difficulties in supplying water to Soweto. The Court applied 
the reasonableness standard in light of this, and found that the policy fell “within the bounds of 
reasonableness”97 It decided this based on the data presented as well as the fact that over the 
course of the litigation of the case, the City had altered various features of the policy. The Court 
concluded this was evidence of flexibility98, one of the features of a reasonable policy. It decided 
this through the admission of sizable quantities of new evidence that were presented by the City 
on appeal. This was a departure from previous approach by the Court, especially since in 
previous cases it had strictly monitored the presentation of new evidence. It justified this by 
pointing to the unique nature of socioeconomic rights litigation, where the introduction of new 
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evidence could be seen to promote the values of responsiveness, accountability, and finally, 
openness.99 
 The Court also struck down the households’ argument that the decision to install 
prepayment meters should have been preceded by some sort of meaningful engagement. It did so 
on the grounds that the decision to install the meters was an executive, not administrative action. 
100
 Additionally, the Court held that meters did not constitute illegal disconnections. Writing the 
judgment, J O’Regan explained that, while the ordinary meaning of discontinuation being that 
something ceases to exist, here: 
“The water supply does not cease to exist when a pre-paid meter temporarily stops the supply of water. It is 
suspended until either the customer purchases further credit or the new month commences with a new 
monthly basic water supply, whereupon the water supply recommences. It is better to understood as a 
temporary suspension in supply, not a discontinuation.”101 
There are a number of important themes to note in the case of Mazibuko. Many in the legal 
community see the ruling as a step back for the Court. Sandra Liebenberg noted that, while the 
Grootboom standard of reasonableness required that state conduct be “assessed in the light of the 
rights entrenched in the first subsections of section 27, in Mazibuko  the Court was only prepared 
to use reasonableness as an over-flexible, abstract, and decontextualized standard of 
governance”102. This is a far cry from the standard as applied in cases such as Grootboom, as 
Liebenberg notes, and TAC. If nothing else this demonstrates the flexibility inherent in the 
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reasonableness standard, which is sometimes helpful and sometimes harmful. The second theme 
to recognize is the large degree of deference the Court afforded the executive in this instance. 
The Court takes the city’s changes to the policy mid-litigation in good faith and rules against the 
implementation of meters as administrative action, identifying it instead as executive action. 
Finally, and perhaps troubling, is the fact that the Court explicitly lays out what it saw as its role 
here and potentially in the future. The Court held that the purpose of socio-economic rights 
litigation is served because the government has been given the option and opportunity to justify 
and in some instances revise its policy. Litigation is not so much a process through which people 
who claim their rights have been violated enforce their entitlements, but instead an elaborate 
form of participation in policy making103. This idea, taken in conjunction with the Court’s 
unwillingness to make a substantive ruling on the nature of socioeconomic rights, does not 
encourage the poor to bring cases before the Court because it is possible they might not see any 
remedy to their situations, even if the Court rules in their favor.  With the gradual failing of other 
institutional remedies, as explored in the introduction, this is particularly concerning.  
This chapter has sought to lay out the contours of the socioeconomic jurisprudence 
developed by the Constitutional Court by examining a number of cases it has faced. Some of the 
main tools and readings that have emerged from its analysis include the rejection of a minimum 
core of rights, the reasonableness standard, meaningful engagement, and the keeping of promises 
by the state. On the other hand, the Court has yet to substantively rule on socioeconomic rights, 
sometimes uses the reasonableness standard in an incredibly abstract manner, and still views 
itself as having a limited role in the process of policy formulation as well as the extent to which 
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is can step into the realms of executive and legislative powers. The next chapter will reflect on 
these, among other, issues where the Court’s jurisprudence seems to be lacking, and in light of 
the lack of effective supplemental chapter nine institutions and government policy, offer a 
variety of approaches that should be taken into consideration as the Court moves forward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Identifying Gaps and Potential Remedies in the Constitutional Court 
Jurisprudence 
“If we don’t find a way to move a serious and rational discussion of  the question of substantive equality  to the 
centre of our politics we’ll be left with the sorry spectacle of the politics of big men trying to rally their troops 
behind nothing but the promise of their protection on their turf.”104 
 Thus, Richard Pithouse characterizes the current situation of South Africa, all the while 
alluding to the potentially devastating consequences of things to come. With these ominous 
words in mind, this chapter calls attention to the shortcomings of the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court and how the current jurisprudence, taken in the context of an untrustworthy 
government, hollow institutions, and struggling economic programs, could better address the 
concerns of incredibly poor South Africans in need.  
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The Court’s mandate gives it numerous powers through which it might exercise greater remedial 
capacity. The Constitution states Section 167(3) that the Constitutional Court: 
 
• is the highest court in all constitutional matters; 
• may decide only constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on 
constitutional matters; and 
• makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is 
connected with a decision on a constitutional matter. 
Additionally, Section 167(4) goes on to give the Constitutional Court exclusive jurisdiction in 
deciding disputes about the powers and constitutional status of branches of government. Only the 
Constitutional Court may: 
• decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning 
the constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of state; 
• decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill; 
• decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution;  
• decide that parliament or the president has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation. 
All courts in South Africa have to apply the Constitution and the law "without fear, favour or 
prejudice" according to Section 165. Additionally, Section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights makes 
special mention of the judiciary's duty in interpreting and developing the law: it has to promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.105 
As a reminder, the specific parts of the Bill of Rights that are pertinent to socioeconomic 
rights are:  
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1. Housing 
A. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
B. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
C. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation 
may permit arbitrary evictions. 
2. Health care, food, water and social security 
A. Everyone has the right to have access to- 
A. health care services, including reproductive health care; 
B. sufficient food and water; and 
C. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and         
their dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
B. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
C. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.106 
Former Chief Justice Pius Langa described the transformative spirit of the Constitution in light of 
these sections as:  
“Not a temporary phenomenon that ends when we all have equal access to resources and basic services and 
when lawyers and judges embrace a culture of justification. Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of 
looking at the world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which 
new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected, and in which change is 
unpredictable but the idea of change is constant. This is perhaps the ultimate vision of a transformative, 
rather than a transitional, constitution. This is the perspective that sees the Constitution as not 
transformative because of its peculiar historical position or its particular socio-economic goals, but because 
it envisions a society that will always be open to change and contestation, a society that will always be 
defined by transformations”107 
 The Constitutional Court and those that write about it have possessed high hopes for what 
actions it can take to contribute to this spirit. Indeed, tasked with developing a jurisprudence 
around socioeconomic rights, the Court in a sense was able to write upon the blank slate of 
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jurisprudence in the most exciting and hopeful period of modern South African history. Sandra 
Liebenberg, in describing how the Constitution envisions the Court, states: 
There is no other institution with both the authority and responsibility to make final binding 
pronouncements on the nature and scope of the rights in the Bill of Rights. If the courts adopt formalistic or 
overly narrow interpretations of the rights in the Bill of Rights, the normative force of human rights 
guarantees in governance and society as a whole will be diminished. This is contrary to the constitutional 
conception of the Bill of Rights as a ‘cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.’108 
The Court is, according to Liebenberg, the single most significant body and branch of 
government through which to ensure that rights such as socioeconomic rights are realized and 
respected.  In marrying the vision of transformation with the role of the Court that Liebenberg 
purports, we can begin to appreciate the crucial role of the Court in South Africa. 
The Court has generally been appreciated though in terms of striving to fulfill its 
mandate. American constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein has written glowingly about the Court, 
specifically in relation to the ruling in Grootboom. He said that: 
“In the Grootboom decision, the Court set out a novel and promising approach to juridical protection of 
socioeconomic rights. This approach requires close attention to the human interests at stake and sensible 
priority setting, but without mandating protection for each person whose socio economics needs are at risk. 
The distinctive virtue of the Court’s approach is that it is respectful of democratic prerogatives and of the 
limited nature of public resources, while also requiring special deliberative attention to those whose 
minimal needs are not being met. The approach of the Constitutional Court stands as a powerful rejoinder 
to those who have contended that socio economic rights do not belong in a constitution. It suggests that 
such rights can serve , not to preempt democratic deliberation, but to ensure democratic attention to 
important interests that might otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate.” 109 
All in all, as reflected in the introduction, the Court has been praised for its actions, for 
being seen as ushering in a new era in human rights law, specifically socioeconomic rights, and 
for taking part in this ever present action of transformation that J Langa describes. However the 
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direness of the current socioeconomic situation, coupled with the lack of other institutional 
mechanisms for addressing socioeconomic rights violations necessitates the Court alter its 
current approach.   
There are a number of ways that the Court could improve upon its existing jurisprudence, 
open up poverty to greater political debate, and encourage access for the poor to the Court. It can 
do so by ruling in a more substantive manner and re-evaluating its use of the reasonableness 
standard, recognize the depoliticizing nature of the rhetoric it is using when ruling on issues of 
poverty, and removing various barriers to litigation, such as allowing greater direct access, 
mandating a method for paying court costs, and taking greater steps to ensure a return on the 
rulings that it issues, specifically for the parties that brought the case to the Court in the first 
place.  Certainly there are further ways that the Court could work to alleviate the various 
inequalities and injustices described previously, but this paper cannot hope to address all of 
them. In essence, while the Court has done an admirable job developing this jurisprudence, there 
are numerous factors that necessitate that the Court take on a larger role, particularly the lack of 
other institutions to effectively address the issues of poverty and socioeconomic rights. 
The Reasonableness Standard 
The reasonableness standard is one of the foundational practices of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Though articulated explicitly in Grootboom, the argument of rationality, the 
precursor to reasonableness, emerged even earlier, in Soobramoney. At its heart, the 
reasonableness standard is an adaptation of administrative law to evaluate compliance with the 
positive duties imposed by socio economic rights as laid out in ss26 and 27.  At the center of this 
evaluation is a state policy, which is judged to be reasonable or not in light of the social, 
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economic, and historical context. Consideration is also given to the capacity of institutions 
responsible for implementing the program.110 According to the Court, a reasonable government 
program in the realm of socio economic rights will: 
• Be capable of facilitating the consideration of the right; 
• Be comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated; 
• Have appropriate financial and human resources made available for the program; 
• Be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provisions for short-,medium-, and long-term 
needs; 
• Be reasonably conceived and implemented; 
• Be transparent, and its contents must be made known effectively to the public. 
• Make short-term provision for those who needs are urgent and who are living in intolerable 
conditions. 111 
The standard is intended to allow the state a level of discretion in relation to the intimate policy 
choices it has to make when realizing socio economic rights. In appropriate cases though, the 
Court will apply a stringent standard of scrutiny to the government regarding their policy 
choices. In the process of doing so, it will be specific regarding the means that need to be 
implemented so that the rights infringed upon are remedied. This standard and the flexibility 
with which it has been applied to many cases such as Soobramoney, Grootboom, TAC, 
Thubelisha Homes, and Mazibuko warrants further inquiry. 
 The reasonableness standard has been praised by numerous scholars as a flexible and 
useful tool for realizing socioeconomic rights. In his article Social and Economic Rights? 
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Lessons from South Africa, Cass Sunstein argues that the Court’s resort to the known principles 
of administrative law in the reasonableness standard makes sense, particularly because in many 
legal systems the review of administrative policy consists of striking a balance between the ever 
competing principles of judicial deference and activism. In utilizing administrative law, the  
Court, specifically in the case of Grootboom, scored an important conceptual victory by laying 
out its perceived role in adjudicating the complicated issues raised by socioeconomic rights 
claims. By laying out this idea, Sunstein argues, the Court illustrated that clarifying social rights 
is not removed from the ordinarily held idea of court’s review function.112 
 In his book The Politics of Principle, Thenius Roux argues, similarly to Sunstein and 
Michelman, that the implementation of the reasonableness standard is a “shrewd” development. 
It has a distinct advantage over other possible approaches because of its flexibility, which allows 
it to identify vulnerable groups and unreasonable policies in a context sensitive approach and 
allows the standard of scrutiny to be adjusted based on the micro-politics of particular cases.  
The very features of the reasonableness review that other scholars decry, according to Roux, are 
in fact its strengths. The open ended nature of the categorization of vulnerable groups is one 
example, in that the reasonableness standard allows the approach of the Court to be shaped to the 
character of a group of claimants. “This contentlessness of the standard..enables the Court to 
enforce significant changes to social and economic policy, without appearing to set 
Government’s priorities for it”.113 Roux believes that that all of these capacities are demonstrated 
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in the TAC case, where the Court rejected a government program and opened up the widespread 
dissemination of pre natal HIV drugs.  
However, Roux admits that the lack of substance in the reasonableness standard “detracts 
from the usefulness as a programmatic guide”114 and there are many critics who bear similar 
concerns. In Grootboom, the case that developed the reasonableness standard most explicitly and 
concerned itself with housing rights, David Bilchitz argues that the lack of substance in the 
ruling detrimentally affected the development of a remedial program by the state. The 
declaratory order that was issued by the Court established that the state is constitutionally 
obliged to create a comprehensive and coordinated program designed to progressively realize the 
right to access to adequate housing enshrined in the Constitution.  The program must include 
relief for, specifically, those who do not have housing, land, and/or are living in intolerable 
conditions. Additionally, the Court declared the program that had existed in the Cape 
Metropolitan area didn’t meet the constitutional obligations of the government because it had 
unreasonably failed to make a plan for those who fell into the categories of desperate need and 
intolerable conditions. The Court held that: 
“Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. The right of 
access to adequate housing is entrenched because we value human beings and want to ensure that they are 
afforded their basic human needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life115 are 
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom, and equality. To be reasonable, 
measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavor to 
realize. Those whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights116 before therefore is most 
in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realization of the right..If the measures, 
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though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they many not pass the 
test”117  
While this may appear a sweeping judgment, with effective remedies stipulated in the 
declaratory order, the enforcement of the order proved delayed and problematic. This was 
exacerbated by the Court not providing clear content of the right to housing in its order.  A study 
conducted two years after the order was handed down by Kameshni Pillay found that the 
Grootboom  order had not been fully implemented by the government.  The study showed that 
“at the time there has been little tangible or visible change in housing policy so as to cater for 
people who find themselves in desperate need or crisis situations.”118 After the ruling the 
government spent an additional year deciding where the responsibility to carry out the 
Grootboom order lay in the provincial government of the Western Cape. Pillay found that on the 
local level the implementation of the judgment was focused specifically on the Grootboom 
community and didn’t go beyond the scope of this into the realm of establishing and effective 
and comprehensive program that catered to all communities in similar or crisis situations. 
Finally, Bilchitz argues, the government interpreted the order narrowly so that it saw disasters 
such as floods or fires as crisis situations and chose not interpret it as mandating the adoption of 
a policy which would meet the needs of those that didn’t have a place to live or a roof over their 
heads.119  
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 As can be seen, the intention behind the order and the practical application of the order 
leave much to be desired. Academic Marius Pieterse argues that courts, at least in South Africa, 
are sufficiently equipped and constitutionally empowered to give tangible effect to 
socioeconomic right without straining their capacity or infringing on the separation of powers. 
To him, a significant obstacle to realizing socio-economic rights through the improved living 
condition of the most impoverished individuals is the abstract and conceptually empty 
articulation of socioeconomic rights, allowing for institutional containment and the subsequent 
suppression of the needs they represent. He states that, “In order for this tendency of 
socioeconomic rights discourse to be effectively countered, constitutional drafters, legislatures, 
litigants, activists, academic, and judges must increasingly concentrate on clarifying the concrete 
content of entitlements embodied by socioeconomic rights and on explicitly link such content to 
the satisfaction of material need.”120 In essence Pieterse argues that for socioeconomic rights 
litigation to be an effective means of recourse for poor individuals, through the Court as well as 
the government programs that flow from the judiciary, the content of socioeconomic rights must 
be articulated so it can be linked to satisfying material needs of impoverished individuals in a 
tangible way.  
Examining this idea from a different angle, the scholar Danie Brand illuminates the 
difficulty of fashioning an effective government policy without some articulation of the content 
of socioeconomic rights by the Court. He contends that if the Court had made more substantive 
interpretations of the rights it addressed in Grootboom, then it would have been beneficial for the 
practical implementation of the order. One main issue with the reasonableness standard is that 
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even though the Court stipulated a number of standards that a policy must meet to be reasonable, 
it has not actually defined what the program or policy should be moving towards. Brand states: 
..the Court’s eventual discussion of the content of the right predictably focuses on concepts of 
‘reasonableness’, ‘progressive realization’, and ‘within available resources’. Nowhere is there a sustained 
and coherent attempt to describe the substantive standard that the government’s policies are supposed to 
work towards. The one such reference (the Court stating that the right to housing ‘entails more than bricks 
and mortar’ and that for the right to be realized, ‘there must be land , there must be services, there must be a 
dwelling121) is cursory, without any reasoning provided to sustain it. Furthermore this brief description of 
the content of the right occurs in the course of a broader argument that housing needs are diverse and 
determined by the geographic, social,  and economic context in which they play out and that, as such, it is 
impossible for a court to prescribe particular substantive duties in terms of the right”122 
Brand argues that the Court never tells the government what goals it should actively be pursuing 
through its programs. It does not lay out what the right to access to housing should be, nor does it 
provide the government with direction, or point to an alternative policy. It merely states that the 
existing one is unreasonable and the next one should take into account those people in desperate 
situations (which the government, as Pillay uncovered, is less than willing to do).  To expect an 
unwilling government to construct and implement a policy without any direction from the Court 
is, in its own way, unreasonable.  
Furthermore the Court flirts with the substantive interpretation that Brand advocates 
when it alludes to the fact that housing is something more than simply bricks and mortar. Even 
when discussing the reasonableness standard above, the Court uses phrases such as basic human 
needs and the basic necessities of life, implying that it has some idea about what these needs may 
be, though they are never made explicit.  By not doing so, the Court gives the government no 
guidelines as to what it should be striving for with its policies. This allows the government to 
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take liberties with their interpretation and implementation that would be more difficult with more 
substantive interpretations of socioeconomic rights, Brand argues.  
  This flight from substance into the procedural has many implications, but Brand perhaps 
describes the paradox of the reasonableness standard best when he says: 
“..the Court does not ask whether state policies are reasonable in the sense they are reasonably capable of 
achieving the progressive realization of the rights in question—it cannot, because it never adequately 
describes the rights against which reasonableness should be tested. Rather, in the absence of a substantive 
referent for a proper means-end reasonableness test, the Court asks whether those policies are reasonable 
simply in the sense they are rational, coherent, comprehensive, inclusive, and so on and so forth. Its 
concern therefore seems not to be with the possible outcome of government policies (whether they will 
actually provide in the basic needs of people)- its concern is whether the government acts in a manner 
consistent with procedural good governance standards in its attempts to realize socioeconomic rights.”123 
This embrace of procedure over substance does little, as can be seen in the case of Grootboom, to 
help alleviate the lived experience of poverty. The case of Mazibuko also provides an account of 
how reasonableness standard, when applied without substantive interpretations, can be 
detrimental to realizing socioeconomic rights.  
 Mazibuko, as related in the previous chapter, consisted of poor families in Phiri fighting 
the city of Johannesburg’s decision to implement pre-paid water meters on their local water taps. 
Their main three contentions were that the water policy of Johannesburg was not reasonably 
capable of realizing the applicants right of access to sufficient water, that the installation of 
prepayment water meters was undertaken without consultation( in relation to the meaningful 
engagement stipulation that the Court laid out in Olivia Rd), and that the automatic disconnection 
of the water meters was illegal because the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 required reasonable 
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notice and an opportunity to make representations prior to the cut off of services.  The Court 
subsequently rejected all of these claims, using the reasonableness standard.  
When tasked with deciding whether the amount of water the city was providing for free 
was sufficient, the Court hid behind a shield of bureaucracy, finding that it did not have the 
capacity to determine what the reasonable amount of water was, though when deciding TAC it 
had engaged in exhaustive research and referenced a large amount of information, “from a 
variety of specialized perspectives, ranging from pediatrics, pharmacology and epidemiology to 
public health administration, economics and statistics124.  It also focused on the large amount of 
evidence the government gave outlining its difficulty in supplying water to Soweto. Given 
another opportunity to rule substantively on the issue of the right to water in the argument that 
prepayment meters resulted in unlawful disconnections, it chose not to do so. Instead it 
sidestepped the issue. Explaining that the “ordinary meaning of discontinuation is that something 
is made to cease to exist”, the Court found: 
“The water supply does not cease to exist when a pre-paid meter temporarily stops the supply of water. It is 
suspended until either the customer purchases further credit or the new month commences with a new 
monthly basic water supply whereupon the water supply recommences. It is better understood as a 
temporary suspension in supply, not a discontinuation.”125 
By giving a fairly convoluted explanation, legal scholar Sandra Leibenberg argues the court not 
only chooses not to address the issue substantively, but also uses a bizarre semantic line of 
reasoning that is difficult to understand and seemingly should not be utilized to characterize the 
effect of state policy on access to basic human needs.  By not addressing the issue substantively 
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and in focusing on the governments purported difficulty in getting water to Soweto, the Court not 
only retreats again into the proceduralism that has become characteristic of it, but also shows a 
deference to the state that demonstrates its perceived role of itself for determining socioeconomic 
rights. This is a very limited role, that seemingly would not offer much hope to applicants, 
whether the Court finds in favor of them or not. With this in mind, the Court at the end of the 
Mazibuko judgment holds that the purpose of socioeconomic rights litigation is served simply 
because of the fact the state has been given an opportunity to justify and resolve its policy. 
Litigation is apparently less a process by which people can claim their rights and the subsequent 
entitlements and more so an elaborate and expensive form of policy making, which results in few 
tangible results for the applicant.  
 Marius Pieterse echoes this point when he argues that for socioeconomic rights to 
function as legal tools of recourse through which denial of need can be confronted and hopefully 
remedied. They must be connected intimately and concretely to their subjects, not grounded in an 
abstract standard of good governance evaluation. His thoughts on the reasonableness standard 
could succinctly be summed up as a critique of the formulation of abstract legal standards for 
measuring compliance with socioeconomic rights. This is because the abstract standards are of 
indirect importance to the poor, the primary beneficiaries of socioeconomic rights. Instead, poor 
individuals are primarily concerned with the actual alleviation of their poverty, or articulations of 
dire need. Legal tools, such as the reasonableness standard, which do not reflect or acknowledge 
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this focus will not “easily correct the diminution of human dignity suffered as a result of such 
hardship.”126   
 Taking both accounts of the reasonableness standard into consideration, it cannot be 
denied that the reasonableness standard has had an important effect on South Africa, and in some 
cases, such as TAC , has resulted in the immediate realization of a solution to one part of a larger 
problem, that of HIV. But in many cases, such as Soobramoney, Grootboom, Thubelisha Homes, 
or Mazibuko, these immediate and effective remedies have not materialized. In essence, it seems 
that for the Court to be more effective in aiding the government in formulating effective and 
reasonable plans it needs to provide explicit guidance by giving greater content to socio 
economic rights. Without doing so, the government can exploit the situation if it so chooses, the 
overall effectiveness of litigation as a remedy for need comes into question, and government 
policies are left flailing in the dark for a program that can target a goal that has not been 
articulated yet. 
In light of this, what can the Court do to take a more substantive approach to 
socioeconomic rights and help mend some of the gaps that have been identified in the 
reasonableness standard? Essentially, what must be undertaken is movement towards a 
reasonableness standard that values substance as much as the current Court does procedure.  It 
can recognize the responsibility of the Court to, according to J Sachs, achieve justice for 
claimants that come before them (the Court) even though their claims occur against a 
background of endemic inequality. J Sachs states that: 
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“The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it difficult for the courts to ensure 
immediate present-day equity at the micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself correct all the systemic 
unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and minimize the degree of injustice and 
inequity which the eviction of the weaker parties in conditions of inequality of necessity entails.”127 
To do so, the Court must begin by approaching cases involving a deprivation of essential human 
needs with a high level of judicial scrutiny and be less deferential to the government. In taking a 
contextualized approach to the case at hand, the Court should ground its consideration in the 
position of the claimant in society, the nature and historical background of the deprivation 
experienced, and the impact of the rights violation on the ability of the individual or group to 
participate in South African society.  
When hearing the justifications the state offers for failing to meet the needs of its citizens, 
the courts should conduct a rigorous proportionality analysis. In doing so it could balance the 
lived hardships of the individual or group before it against the various obstacles the state offers 
for improving the situation. Interestingly, if it approached cases with a higher level or scrutiny, it 
is possible that the Court might have found it in its capacity to ensure basic needs of individuals. 
For example, in Mazibuko, although the state offered evidence showing its difficulty delivering 
water and the Court deferred to the state on this matter, soon after the ruling was handed down 
the state not only did away with prepayment meters that shut off water completely (in favor of 
ones that only substantially limited the outflow of water) but also increased the monthly 
allocation of free water that households would receive. Doing so implies the resources were 
available, and while legal mobilization is what brought the action about, not the ruling of the 
Court, it is worth pointing out that had the Court conducted extensive research, as was the case in 
TAC and not been so deferential to the state’s role, then it might have been able to mandate that 
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such action be carried out. The Court is in a unique position in the country to examine the micro-
injustices that result due to policy, and highlight the effect of these of claimants in everyday 
situations128 as well as give them some means of recourse. 
To conduct such a proportionality test though, the Court must rule substantively on the 
issues it faces. It must articulate what the basic entitlements of a right are, and in doing do, not 
only give the state much needed direction and objectives when formulating policy, but also give 
themselves a baseline by which to analyze cases and issues of allocation or violation that come 
before them. Additionally, it is important to note that the ‘progressive realization’ of such rights 
that are stipulated in the constitution should not just end at the substantive levels that the Court 
should set out. The idea of progressive realization implies a dynamic that is continuously moving 
forward as advances in social and economic rights are made, so that when basic needs have been 
met, it is possible to strive for more and constantly bolster and uplift the situations of the poor 
and marginalized in South Africa.   
 By adopting these measures, and therefore developing a substantive reasonableness 
standard, the Court would facilitate greater realization of socioeconomic rights. It would provide 
the state with a clear objective to strive for, encourage greater actions around socioeconomic 
rights, and ensure a transformational jurisprudence by constantly pushing the envelope forward 
to benefit South Africa and its citizens.  This is important because with the lack of other 
institutions to articulate clear programmatic guidelines or objectives, there is the risk of programs 
constantly oscillating between the Court and the government. By oscillating I mean the pattern of 
a government policy being brought before the Court and that policy subsequently being declared 
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unreasonable but with no clear articulation of the tangible goals it should be striving for. The 
government then tries to remedy the program (or doesn’t) without clear direction and upon 
implementation could again find itself before the Court where the pattern begins anew. Thus a 
cycle occurs where programs are created but are not causing tangible results. Such a cycle occurs   
at the detriment of those they are supposed to help, namely, the poor. If the Court fails to 
substantively rule on rights so as to provide some semblance of a programmatic guide it is likely 
that South Africa will continue to be stuck in its current socioeconomic situation.   
 Another action the Court should take is to recognize, and subsequently avoid, the way 
that their judgments commonly reflect a depoliticizing rhetoric around the interpretation of 
poverty and need. While not an area that is typically given much attention, by depoliticizing 
poverty in much the same way that the legislative and executive branch do, the Court has a 
depressing effect on the agency of poor individuals in South Africa and discourages public 
interest litigation, by seemingly naturalizing the individuals lived experience of poverty. Karl 
Klare asked an important question when he wrote that, with the idea of a transformative 
constitution in mind, “whether the judgments produced by judges eroded or reinforced discursive 
politics, opens up space for political contestation, and in doing so, deepens democratic culture, or 
ignores it?”129 The Constitutional Court occupies a unique place in moving forward South 
Africa’s transformative constitution. By occupying this place, it needs to be aware of the weight 
that its adjudication can carry in closing down the space for political contestation. I will lay out 
the ways in which this occurs, and then draw examples from a number of cases, involving 
Soobramoney, Grootboom, and TAC. 
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The Court’s De-Politicization of Poverty and Need 
Poverty and basic need-these two words encompass a number of specific social problems 
that the Constitution and socioeconomic rights in particular hope to help alleviate. As noted in 
previous chapters many have contended that the rectifying of these situations are essentially 
political questions, not to be ruled upon by the courts. While the Court can affect these issues in 
a number of ways through its rulings, in the venue of politics, different understandings of issues 
are argued and debated daily. These debates are of primary importance to participatory forms of 
politics that South Africa holds dear. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, issues like 
the lack of access to basic services such as sanitation or water are increasingly resulting in 
popular movements that are aimed seeking remedies-essentially these movements are engaging 
directly in political action that helps contribute to an overarching political debate (in Parliament, 
among individuals, and in the media) about where the responsibilities to address these issues lie 
and how a solution might be carried out. According to social theorist Nancy Fraser, in South 
Africa, “talk about people’s needs is a species of political discourse..has been institutionalized as 
a major vocabulary of politics, and is an idiom in which political conflict is played out and 
through which inequalities are symbolically elaborated and challenged”.130 
 However, in South African government there is a tendency to depoliticize these issues, or 
to speak of them as though they are not political, or not capable of being politically contested. 
When, as has been the case in both the US and South Africa, the government warns about the 
supposed culture of dependency that extending social welfare fosters, they are pointing to poor 
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people as being responsible for the current shortcomings of their situation. Many times, poverty 
is laid at the feet of forces supposedly beyond our control, such as a lack of natural resources, or 
globalization, so as to show that political action on this issue is somehow useless or futile.  
 Political discourse around poverty and our basic needs is a repetitive process of 
politicization, de-politicization, and re-politicization of the various issues in contention. In doing 
so, a variety of methods are usually utilized by marginal groups, such as those in poverty, to 
argue for remedies such as social security, or adequate housing. More dominant or powerful 
groups usually oppose these arguments, intent on preserving their various privileges, and try to 
remove these arguments from the political areas in which they could be argued, and potentially 
remedied. This is usually done in a number of ways, including domesticating issues of poverty 
and need, the personalization of need and dependence, the naturalization of poverty, and the 
instrumentalizing of needs talk. All of these tools come together to turn the issue of poverty 
away from political debate and remedies, and push it back onto those experiencing it.  
 The first of these tools, domestication, seeks to describe issues of poverty and need as 
concerns that fall solely within the domestic sphere (primarily the family) as opposed to the 
political sphere. At its heart this casts these issues as private and familial issues instead of private 
political. Law professor Martha Fineman offers further embellishment: 
The private family is the social institution that is relied upon to raise children and care for the ill, the needy 
and the dependent. Ideally it performs these tasks as a self-contained and self-sufficient unit without 
demanding public resources to do so. In the societal division of labor among institutions, the private family 
bears the burden of dependency, not the public state. Resort to the state is considered a failure. By 
according to the private family the responsibility for inevitable dependency, society directs dependency 
away from the state and privatizes it.”131 
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By placing the onus on the family to provide for themselves, the issue of poverty is removed 
from the political, where it ostensibly cannot be solved, and to the familial realm, whose 
responsibility it is to take care of those within it.  
 Another common strategy that is used by privileged groups is the personalization of need 
and dependence. In this case, the quality of being in poverty or dependent is due to the personal 
characteristics, flaws, and shortcomings of poor people themselves. The social, economic, and 
political forces and systems that perpetuate poverty are not held responsible for what they create. 
This refrain is heard time and time again- that poor people are lazy, ignorant, or generally just 
bad people. In doing so, groups label the poor as an “other”, something that is deviant. Indeed, 
perceptions and assumptions about the moral failings of the poor and their resulting 
responsibility for their own hardships are common in South Africa. This can perhaps be best seen 
through the way in which South Africa’s social assistance system is built on a division between, 
allegedly deserving and undeserving poor. It is predominantly special needs based, as regular 
grants are only paid to vulnerable groups such as the elderly and children, while no assistance is 
provided for the “able-bodied” poor, tacitly endorsing the idea that these individuals should be 
able to earn their own living. 
 The next strategy that is commonly employed by powerful groups in political discourse is 
the adoption of rhetoric that naturalizes poverty. In the way that the previous strategy avoids 
taking social, political, and economic forces into account, this strategy reverses that and 
attributes poverty to forces that are entirely outside the control of society, such as capitalism or 
globalization. This can occur in two ways. First, the state or other groups can fall victim to the 
enormity of poverty, simply stepping back and saying that there is so much of that it will always 
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be here in one form or another. The second is the placing of responsibility for poverty on forces 
outside of society’s control, such as the de-personified and mysterious forces of the global 
market. What these arguments both share is the notion that poverty is in one way or another 
natural and part of the structure of our society-ipso facto is will always be there, no matter what 
we do. 132 
 The final strategy for depoliticizing poverty is the instrumentalization of needs talk.133 
The political discourse around need occurs in a number of different spaces and between a variety 
of actors- NGO’s, academics, social movements, as well as more official organs of discourse like 
Parliament or special administrative agencies. These actors occupy different areas of power in 
the dialogue, with the descriptions of poverty and need in places such as Parliament or 
administrative agencies officially sanctioned. Because of this, these institutions have an 
authoritative power over the political dialogue in reference to these issues, yet they consistently 
depoliticize them. They do so by, in the process of transforming politicized needs in to 
administrable solutions, talking about political issues of poverty in a way that makes them 
“technical problems for managers and planners..in contradistinction to political matters”134. What 
this does is reduce the issue to a technically complex problem with which an average citizen 
cannot meaningfully engage.  Additionally, those who are not experts yet participate in the 
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discourse, mainly those claiming that their needs be met, are recast as passive recipients of 
services, not as active political participants in how their needs are determined or met. Essentially, 
their political engagement is negated. All of the aforementioned strategies are employed in South 
Africa and are a cause for concern because they are at their core attempts by society to purport its 
helplessness in the face of extreme poverty and to do nothing about that which it undeniably has 
some control over.  
 The Court, in its socioeconomic rights judgments, has formed and will continue to form a 
significant aspect of the South African process of juridification, or the growth of regulation or 
law in the welfare state. Specifically, this law is regulatory or instrumentalized law, not aimed at 
resolving particular disagreements or predicaments, but at guiding, constituting, and giving effect 
to the social welfare programs and objectives of the government. Because of this, the Court is 
part of, and sometimes cardinal to the political rhetoric around areas of poverty. Juridification, 
which includes some of the work of the Court in the instances which it interprets and applies 
socioeconomic rights, has the ability to exercise a depressing effect on critical political action by 
utilizing rhetoric in its judgments that breaks down or subverts the variety of social movements 
and organizations upon which political action is dependent.  
Through the interpretations of need and poverty that the Court authorizes in its rulings it 
legitimizes the depoliticizing strategy that political actors employ by drawing the limits of the 
political and determining which issues related to poverty and need are susceptible to political 
contestation. In some of its rulings, the court has employed similar depoliticizing strategies to the 
ones explored previously and in doing so has identified aspects of poverty and need as falling 
outside the scope of politics and therefore potential political remedies. These have traditionally 
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occurred when the Court is faced with an argument for an affirmative Constitutional right, one 
that would mandate the state do something.  
 One instance of the Court engaging in a domestication strategy was in J Sach’s 
concurring opinion in Soobramoney. In addition to the depoliticizing rhetoric Sachs offers, there 
is also an element of, as mentioned previously, the Courts unwillingness to engage substantively 
with issues. The majority of Sach’s judgment deals with an explanation of why the Court could 
not intervene in this instance, specifically on behalf of Mr. Soobramoney. Sachs calls upon 
traditional arguments of those that argued against the justicability of socioeconomic rights, 
particularly the arguments about institutional capacity and limited resources, specifying that with 
respect to the issues the Court faced in Soobramoney(medical treatment) the Court was not 
equipped to decide resource allocation. He argues that, “If governments were unable to confer 
any benefit on any person unless it conferred an identical benefit on all, the only viable option 
would be to confer no benefit on anybody.”135 He concludes that “courts are not the proper place 
to resolve the agonizing personal..problems that underlie these issues….our country’s legal 
system cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient..and those 
who care about the patient.”136 Normative debate about what impact this might have on 
healthcare or access to medicine is not invited. In a few decisive sentences Sachs has limited the 
space for debate around the issue, and with phrases such as “agonizing personal problems” and  
“intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient and those who care about the patient” he has 
effectively removed the issue from political contestation and relegated it to the role of the 
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private, or familial setting. In searching for ways to justify the Court’s inaction, which could 
certainly be justified, Sachs ended up utilizing rhetoric that detrimentally affect the ability of 
groups to argue about the nature of healthcare in the political sphere, by determining that such 
debate or decision making was not actually political but personal and private. In doing he 
depoliticizes this issue by domesticating it. 
 Another example of this can be found in the case of Grootboom. The claimants argument 
was partially based upon children’s section 28(1)c right to shelter. While J Yacoob’s judgment 
on the issue, was decided in favor of the claimants under section 26(1), he did interpret the 
aforementioned section. The mainstay of this interpretation was the synthesis of section 28(1) c 
with section 28(1) a, which stated a child’s right to “family care of parental care, or to 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”137 According to J 
Yacoob this meant that the state only had an indirect duty to provide shelter for children as the 
primary responsibility to do so rests on parents and family and the state should only become 
involved in the absence of this unit.138 Where children are cared for by parents or families, the 
only duty of the state is to “provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to 
ensure that Children are accorded the protection contemplated by s 28”.139 Yacoob concludes, 
quite unambiguously, that: 
“It was not contended that the children who are respondents in this case should be provided with shelter 
apart from their parents. Those of the respondents in this case who are children are being cared for by their 
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parents ; they are not in the care of the State, in any alternative care, or abandoned. Therefore, there is no 
obligation upon the state to provide shelter to those of the respondents who are children.”140 
The rhetorical effect of this ruling is that J Yacoob moves dependency away from the state and 
onto the family. In doing so, he, like J Sachs, privatizes the issue and depoliticizes it. He ignores 
the fact that children who are with their families, but families that are very poor, are often worse 
off than those receiving alternative care from the state, because their parents are often too poor to 
properly care for them. By doing so he is alleviating the state of taking action to help alleviate 
the living situations of children of poor families, specifically in relation to housing, instead 
deciding that families are responsible for their children and themselves. He also is able to avoid 
the question of whether children needs should take priority over those of others. Though later 
reversed in the TAC case, this is still evidence of the Court, subconsciously or not, succumbing 
to rhetoric that shuts down the political space of contestation that is so essential to the 
transformative aspect at the heart of South Africa politics.  
 Lastly, it is worth noting the recurring instrumentalization of needs, specifically 
institutional capacity arguments, which the Court engages in throughout the cases of 
Soobramoney, Grootboom, and TAC.  In dealing with these three cases the Court regularly 
utilizes the institutional capacity argument to justify its inaction. This argument touts the lack of 
the requisite technical expertise and institutional capacity to properly engage with the issues at 
hand and therefore justifies its inaction while also justifying its choice not to decide a particular 
question that is raised by socioeconomic rights litigation. For example, in TAC, which is 
commonly seen as the apex of socioeconomic jurisprudence in the country,  the Court chooses 
not to decide whether the State’s constitutional obligations in relation to s 27(1) forces it to 
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provide formula feed to HIV-positive mothers. Though doing so would prevent the transmission 
of HIV to their breastfeeding children, the Court says this area “raises complex issues”141 which 
the Court does not have the capacity to decide. The Court utilizes instrumentalization to also 
justify taking a general stance of deference towards the executive and legislature and a restrained 
view of how it analyzes state conduct with the reasonableness standard.142143 
While these actions are generally perceived as uncontroversial, and in line with the 
separation of powers that the Constitution lays out, the Court directly and indirectly 
instrumentalizes the questions it encounters, describing these issues as “technical problems for 
managers and planners..in contradistinction to political matters”144 In doing so the Court is 
washing its hands of the issues, saying they are too complex for it to address. The Court is 
reducing the issue to a technically complex problem with which those who are not experts in the 
area cannot meaningfully engage. The message is that socioeconomic rights are technical rather 
than political in nature and that it is the responsibility of the other branches of government to 
deal with said issues. The idea the Court conveys to other unofficial actors such as NGO’s or 
social movements is that  not only are the issues that they seek to address  difficult in a technical 
sense that they might not have the capacity for, but also that these are issues are simply none of 
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their business. The rhetoric of the Court relegates those who are not experts or part of the official 
organs of democracy, yet participate in the discourse, to the status of passive recipients of 
services, not active political participants in how their needs are determined or met. The political 
branches of government will determine what the poor need, and then deliver it to them. The 
poor, or others who work on their behalf, are not to be part of the process, because if the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa recognizes it is not its role to substantively engage with 
socioeconomic issues, why should these various unofficial actors think otherwise?  
While based on sounds logic or the separation of powers, the language and rhetoric the 
Court uses in its judgments is guilty of depoliticizing poverty in a number of ways, that signal to 
the rest of South Africa that the issues of poverty and need are not political, and therefore shut 
down the spaces in which they can be contested. This certainly has an impact on socioeconomic 
rights legislation, as well as what perceived gains can be made through the political system. 
Furthermore, this sort of issue could certainly be part of the motivation for non-institutional 
political actions like street protests and the illegal reconnection of services like water and 
electricity. In further developing its jurisprudence, the Court must be highly cognizant of this 
language, and avoid it at all costs.  
Practical Obstacles to Public Interest Litigation 
The three practical barriers to public interest litigation that most stand out in how they 
affect the Court’s role as an institutional voice for the poor are issues with direct access to the 
Court by individuals, how the costs of Court cases are decided, and the lack of returns that 
litigants see, even when cases are ruled in their favor. These three issues combine to produce 
substantial technical and practical obstacles to pursuing public interest litigation as a strategy for 
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having rights realized. This is an important human rights strategy, and therefore these obstacles 
should not be overlooked.  
 The Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to function as the Court of first 
instance by allowing direct access “when it is in the interests of justice and with leave of the 
Constitutional Court”145 Yet even though poor people generally pursue two means of getting 
their rights realized, protest and litigation, there are incredibly few poor people that bring cases 
before the Court in relation to the number of decisions that the Court hands down each year. The 
Court has only granted direct access eight times from 1995-2006 and even so, has never allowed 
and ‘off the street’ complaint by a poor person to be heard or voiced.146 Jackie Dugard, a lawyer 
at the Socioeconomic Rights Institute, observed that: 
 “While spending two weeks in the Registry conducting archival research during February 2005-poor 
people who came to the Court registry window were sent away with a copy of the Court rules, regardless of 
whether their complaint raised substantive Constitutional issues. Such severe gate-keeping occurred in the 
context of a low caseload, which suggested to me that the Court could hear a number of direct access cases 
each year, if these were appropriately screened for raising Constitutional issues in the public interest.”147 
How could this be pursued differently, and what might Dugard mean by appropriate screening? 
For examples one can look to Latin America, another place at the forefront of progressive 
judiciaries, and see how courts there have handled this issue. The Constitutional Court of Costa 
Rica accepts any sort of direct claim, written in a variety of forms, and in doing so, considers 
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around 17,000 direct claim cases each year.148 Another place to look for an example is Columbia, 
where the Constitutional Court of Columbia has generally considered around 800 direct access 
cases each year.149 If the Court continues hear a paltry number of direct access cases, it risks 
losing levels of legitimacy and recusing itself from the important debate around socioeconomic 
rights. 
 To allow greater access and facilitate the hearing of constitutional matters that might not 
make it through the traditional judicial system, the Court would be wise to adopt a more ably and 
appropriately staffed Court Registry office. Such a system can be seen once again in the 
Constitutional Court of Costa Rica, which is only able to consider the massive number of direct 
access cases due to the intensive use of trained legal clerks who typically screen direct access 
applications for merit while the Court hands down concise rulings on the applications that do 
make it though. The Court would be wise to adopt a similar system in which interns, volunteers, 
or law students might scan the applications of direct access applicants for substantive 
constitutional issues before moving them onto the Court registry. Additionally, in cases that 
seem to be particularly contentious or substantial in relation to the Constitution, Court Registry 
employees or volunteers might refer the case to a relevant civil society or public interest 
organization that might consider representing the applicant in a direct access case. In this vein, 
the Court should also encourage and allow these organizations to access the direct access route. 
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In doing so, it would be encouraging more people or organizations to bring cases forward 
because it would greatly reduce the costs and time involved in litigating the issues in question. 
By pursuing a more open process of direct access, the Court would have greater contact with the 
very people it aims to help, be fostering a dialogue around socioeconomic rights, and pursuing a 
transformative vision.  
 The issue of cost that was briefly raised in the previous paragraph brings us to the second 
barrier at issue here- the way that cost orders are currently carried out. The general practice of 
litigation is that “the successful party should be given their costs”, 150 which occurs at the judge’s 
discretion. That being said there is usually an exception made for public interest matters, due to 
the potentially disastrous consequences to public interest organizations if they experience one 
adverse order and are forced to therefore pay their own costs as well as those of the party they 
took to court. Therefore it is critical that the judiciary holds to this exception and does not just 
burden an organization that loses a public interest case with all the costs of the litigation. If 
judges choose not to adhere to this strictly, then there is the ever present threat that one adverse 
ruling could bankrupt an organization, a threat that will discourage many individuals and NGO’s 
from bringing their issues before the Court at all. This is unacceptable for litigation that seeks to 
uplift people, and further develop South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism. Yet the 
Constitutional Court, while having made several proclamations reinforcing the idea that judges 
should adhere to the aforementioned exception, continues to see this as a secondary concern to 
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the more common law approach that costs should be awarded at the discretion of the judge151 
This is despite the Court recognizing that costs and the awarding of them play an important role 
in litigation, stressing that: 
“One can think off-hand of at least one reason why this general rule[that costs follow the results] might not 
apply to constitutional litigation, mainly that it could have a chilling effect on litigants, other than the 
wealthiest, desirous of enforcing their constitutional rights. In might also no apply where the 
constitutionality of a statue is challenged, a matter which would usually be one of public interest”152 
 Due to this apparent awareness of the issues such a practice could promote, it is surprising that 
the court has not been more decisive in establishing binding orders or rules in relation to the 
awarding of costs in public interest litigation. One case that represents the fears of all parties is 
that of Biowatch, in which the NGO Biowatch took Monsanto South Africa to court in order to 
gain access to information about genetically modified organisms. After a long an drawn out 
battle in the courts, the case was ruled in favor of Biowatch, who was then awarded with its own 
court costs, as well as Monsanto’s. Though it appealed this decision a number of times (the 
Constitutional Court chose not to hear this case) it was eventually ruled that Biowatch would pay 
the court costs of itself and Monsanto. This resulted in the liquidation of Biowatch because the 
organization could not in fact do so. This is the worst case scenario and a visible deterrent to 
public interest litigators or organizations unless the Constitutional Court takes further measures 
to make explicit and binding the guidelines and exceptions around costs.  
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 Finally there needs to be a greater return on substantive relief for individuals who come 
to the Court seeking relief from the hardship of their current situations. At its onset, the Court 
recognized that: 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions 
already existed when the constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our 
society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow 
ring.”153 
Yet many, including the applicants in Grootboom, see little tangible change in their immediate 
lives from Court rulings. In Grootboom, many of the applicants are still waiting on viable 
housing. In Thabelisha Homes, the victory was merely not being evicted, in spite of the Court 
ruling it was legal to do so, and the proposals to upgrade the existing settlement have not yet 
been put into effect. Certainly there are benefits to each ruling, and in some where the Court 
ruled against the applicants, such as Mazibuko, the legal mobilization around the Free Water 
Policy of Johannesburg actually applied enough pressure to the city that it changed the policy, 
providing more water of their own accord. However, the fact that legal mobilization was carried 
out is a testament to the organization and steadfastness of the applicants, because as in the 
previously noted cases, the tangible returns to them had the potential to be nonexistent. 
Specifically, the Court needs to make it a point, in its orders, to address the lived situation of the 
people coming before it, especially when it finds in favor of them. While changes to national 
housing policy or an inadvertent stay to evictions is beneficial, the Court needs to take  a more 
supervisory role in seeing that its orders are carried out, because as noted before in Grootboom, 
the government dragged its feet and this resulted in the suffering of citizens. While this might 
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seem a secondary issue, the hope to improve their own lives is what brings people to the Court in 
the first place. When they win a case, the result should not be that they die “homeless and 
penniless”154 in a shack in Wallacedene, as was the case with the lead applicant in the 
Grootboom case, Irene Grootboom. 
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Conclusion 
First examining the momentum that necessitated socioeconomic rights be included in the 
South African Constitution of 1994, this thesis has sought to outline a slightly different approach 
to socioeconomic jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court should consider in light of the 
failure of other civil pillars to deliver substantive change around the issuing of economic 
inequality. It has done so by initially examining a number of cases that have been brought before 
the Constitutional Court since its conception, focusing specifically on landmark rulings on 
certain key issues. Some of the main mechanisms and readings that have emerged from this 
analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence include the rejection of a minimum core of rights, the 
reasonableness standard, meaningful engagement, and the keeping of promises by the state. 
These mechanisms are certainly useful and represent the culmination of the Court’s struggle with 
contradictory forces in South Africa-a market economy that is supported by a largely capitalistic 
government and a strong populist desire and movement to rectify seemingly entrenched 
economic inequality that leave millions in poverty. However, in light of the ineptitude of Chapter 
Nine Institutions, the rampant distrust of government and economic agendas that have largely 
abandoned the idea of comprehensive development, the Court must alter its approach.  
The Court is perhaps the strongest institution in the country of South Africa today. It is 
one of the few places for people to pursue institutional redress.  In light of this, this thesis 
critically examined the reasonableness standard, the depoliticizing rhetoric around poverty the 
Court uses, as well as practical obstacles for individuals or groups pursuing public interest 
litigation through the judiciary.  It has found that for the Court to be a more effective institution 
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in light of the failings of other bodies conceived of by the Constitution, a number of the Court’s 
approaches must be altered slightly.  The reasonableness standard must function more effectively 
as a programmatic guide for the government by substantively articulating a minimum core, one 
which will give the government programs a goal to pursue and halt the vicious circle of programs 
that don’t know what they are aspiring to.  
Secondly the Court, as one of the few mediums of institutional redress, should also be 
more cognizant of the tacit message it is delivering in its judgments.  Language plays a 
particularly important role in human rights claims and even articulating grievances in the 
language of human rights is a conscious choice that appeals to certain emotions and institutions. 
When reading between the lines of the Court’s judgments, it can be seen that it legitimizes the 
depoliticizing strategy that participants in the political debate employ by drawing the limits of 
the political and determining which issues related to poverty and need are legitimately 
susceptible to political contestation. In some of its rulings, the court has employed depoliticizing 
strategies such as domestication, naturalization, instrumentalization, and personalization. In 
doing so has identified aspects of poverty and need as falling outside the scope of politics and 
therefore potential political remedies. The resulting message to other unofficial actors such as 
NGO’s or social movements is that  not only are the issues that they seek to address  difficult in a 
technical sense that they, like the Court, might not have the capacity for, but that these are issues 
are simply none of their business. Moving forward, the Court needs to better recognize the cost 
of the language it uses in its judgments.  
Finally, there are various practical barriers that prevent individuals from accessing the 
Court. One is issues with direct access to the Court by individuals and how a lack of institutional 
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facilitation in regard to direct access discourages applicants to the Court. Creating a Court 
Registry similar to those of courts in Costa Rica or Columbia would provide some measure of 
remedy for this. The costs of Court cases also stand as a potential obstacle in that there is no 
codified method for awarding costs, meaning that sometimes, based on the discretion of the 
judge, applicants who win public interests cases are forced to pay the costs of the party they took 
to court, which has resulted in the liquidation of public interest organizations. The fear of a 
similar result can potentially dissuade NGO’s or individuals from taking parties that chose not to 
respect human rights, particularly socioeconomic rights, to court.  Finally the lack of returns that 
litigants see, even when cases are ruled in their favor, does not motivate further public interest 
litigation. Claimants come before the Court hoping to have their lived experience addressed and 
rectified-whether they wish to not be evicted, have better access to services, or be provided 
healthcare. Time and time again these benefits, even when the case has been ruled in the 
claimants favor, have not materialized. The lack of tangible benefits for claimants makes them 
wonder why they even came to the Court in the first place. Unless the Court takes a more 
stringent and supervisory approach to its rulings, particularly when they involve the 
implementation of a new program, this lack of return on a case seems unlikely to change.  These 
three issues combine to produce substantial technical and practical obstacles to pursuing public 
interest litigation as a strategy for having rights realized. 
 In conclusion, the Court has done many great things in guiding a new South 
Africa through the past 20 years of freedom that the country has enjoyed. It has been at the 
forefront of developing a jurisprudence of socioeconomic rights and will more than likely 
continue to do so in the future. But the situation has changed from when the Court initially 
started functioning. Institutions and economic programs have changed or fallen away, the 
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government has lost much of the trust it had immediately after negotiating the end of apartheid, 
and many poor people have taken to the streets in desperate protest. There is still a vast economic 
divide between the privileged and the un-privileged in South Africa, one that bears a deadly 
burden of poverty for those who are not among a lucky few. In a hallway of Old Fort Prison in 
Johannesburg, where Gandhi and Nelson Mandela were once held, there is a proverb is inscribed 
in the stone wall that states, “If you want to walk fast walk alone, if you want to walk far walk 
together.” As the country moves forward, the Constitutional Court must shoulder a greater load 
of responsibility and take more holistic jurisprudential approach as it works to enforce the 
Constitution. It can do so by changing its current approach, and in doing so, attempting to ensure 
that millions are not left behind in poverty as the country hopes to realize the lofty potential of its 
Constitution.  
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